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Abstract
Lone wolf terrorism has received considerable media attention, yet this phenomenon has
not been sufficiently examined in an academic study. National security officials must
distinguish between terrorist activities carried out by lone wolves and those carried out by
terrorist networks for effective intervention and potential prevention. The purpose of this
qualitative study was to explore the phenomenon of the leaderless lone wolf terrorist and
the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away
from an existing radical movement. The theoretical framework for this study was
leaderless resistance theory. Secondary data from interviews, field notes, and surveys
from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Database
were analyzed using open and selective coding. Findings revealed 3 individual-level
underlying mechanisms and processes (personal and political grievance, risk and status
seeking, unfreezing) that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical
movement and to act unilaterally without direction toward violent ends. Findings also
indicated that no single typology fits all perpetrators. The findings benefit national
security officials and intelligence agencies by identifying lone wolf individuals, weighing
the actual threat versus the perception, developing better counterterrorism strategies for
the lone wolf phenomenon, and enhancing relations with outside agencies. Results may
improve understanding of lone wolf terrorism and may be used to develop new policies to
predict and track future threats.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law (TTSRL, 2013) stated
that 80% of lone wolf terrorism attacks in the United States have come from within.
According to TTSRL (2013), lone wolf terrorism is more widespread in the United States
than in other countries, with U.S. attacks representing about 42% of all lone wolf attacks.
National security officials must distinguish between terrorist activities carried out by lone
wolves and those carried out by terrorist networks. Identifying these threats is imperative.
Lieberman and Collins (2011) pointed out that the role of national security is to provide
direct contact with other government agencies to thwart the attacks. Lone wolf terrorism
is countered through examination of key trends, dimensions, and features. Examples of
lone wolf attacks in the United States included the following:
•

the 2013 bombing of the Boston marathon;

•

the 2013 Navy Yard shooting in Maryland;

•

the 2012 attempted suicide bombing of the U.S. Capital building;

•

the 2011 shooting of an Arizona congresswoman and her supporters;

•

the 2010 plane attack of an IRS building in Austin, Texas, by a tax protestor;

•

the 2010 botched car bomb in New York Times Square attempting to blow up
the subway system;

•

the 2010 bomb plot in Dallas to blow up a former president’s house;

•

the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood by an army psychiatrist;

•

the 2009 shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas, Army recruiting center by an
Islamic militant; and
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•

the 2009 murder of a D.C. museum security officer by a man fascinated with
Nazi Germany.

To prepare and protect the public, the U.S. government made modifications to
Section 206 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), known as the lone wolf
provision (DeRosa, 2005). The modifications in Section 206 allowed the government to
obtain judicial-instructed access to all things that are touchable, such as organizational
files, in terrorist investigations. The stipulations increased access to documents that might
be wanted and decreased the standard for a judicial official to give out a forceful
command regarding their production (Lui, 2011). This modification was made because
the behavior of a lone wolf terrorist is more difficult to detect apart from microcells (Lui,
2011). There are fewer opportunities for lone wolf terrorists to be caught because they act
individually when planning the attacks, making it difficult for national security or law
enforcement officials to trace them (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP],
2012). This is one of the reasons why national security officials and the intelligence
community declared the lone wolf threat as one of the greatest to national security (IACP,
2012).
Many officials are concerned that something like 9/11 may occur again but on a
larger scale. However, national security officials must also be concerned with smaller
attacks by lone wolves (Carafano, 2011). National security officials must identify and
thwart these attacks before they occur. However, if they do occur, officials must react
quickly using coordinated efforts. One thing Congress can do is enhance reaction times;
lone wolf terrorist attacks are ongoing, and national security must be ready at any
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moment (Carafano, 2011). Also, Congress must continue to update the U.S. Patriot Act
because that might be the most efficient way to deal with the threat before it happens
(Carafano, 2011). Finally, Congress should make sure that all government agencies are
working together for information-sharing purposes and partnerships, as each unit plays an
integral role in protecting the nation (Carafano, 2011). Although every attack cannot be
thwarted, this approach may be Congress’s best line of defense against terrorist attacks.
Background
The unique nature of these attacks requires lone wolves to act alone during an
event, raising concerns among national security officials and citizens of the United States.
Bergen and Hoffman (2010) stated that it is not costly for terrorists to carry out an attack.
Carrying out an attack may cost only a few thousand dollars for an individual or
microcell (Levitt, 2017). What is most frightening about this phenomenon is that it can be
carried out swiftly, with minimum funding and preparation. (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010).
Terrorist threats are ongoing, especially toward the West, and U.S. national security
officials must enhance all security measures to thwart attacks.
The capability among government agencies for sharing information and
collaborating could enhance security measures when faced with a sudden attack.
According to Bakker and DeGraaf (2011), counterterrorism operations need to be better
equipped to detect lone wolf signals that indicate an individual’s intent to carry out a
terrorist attack. This requires efficient information collection and utilization throughout
the information management process, which usually goes through the intelligence
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community production process. It also requires the intelligence community to work in
partnerships with other agencies.
Research has shown that lone wolf attacks are often botched because of
operational mistakes. Lone wolves follow a process and are vulnerable during the
planning period. For example, U.S. Army Pfc. Naser Jason Abdon was arrested on
suspicion after he planned to attack a store near the Fort Hood military base in Texas.
The attack was thwarted because of several operational mistakes he made (Coffey 2011).
Jose Pimentel, a natural U.S. citizen, was caught with improvised explosive devices he
planned on using in New York. This attack was hindered due to Pimentel making himself
vulnerable to detection by way of his Internet activities (Coffey, 2011). National security
officials and other government agencies must detect these mishaps during the lone wolf’s
preparation phase and use every resource to capitalize on mistakes.
Studies have shown that terrorists often follow a model set by their predecessors.
Lone terrorists’ actions often mimic those of a group or individual, but they must
improvise and/or scale down their method of attack because of unforeseen circumstances
and conditions (Friedman, Harper, & Preble, 2010). This is the strategy national security
officials must exploit to detect patterns established by prior terrorists. As their method of
attacks change and evolve due to unforeseen circumstances and conditions, national
security officials must also adjust their method of detection (McClure, 2013). In 1994,
intelligence efforts for security officials were revised in New York by Police
Commissioner William Bratton. The revisions reduced violent and serious crime in New
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York by 80%, and New York is now considered one of the safest large cities in the
United States (Albrecht, 2011).
Revisions continue to have a significant impact, even with the additional
counterterrorism methods that have been implemented since 9/11 (Albrecht, 2011).
Tikuisis (2009) provided statistics on U.S. states that are prone to terrorist attacks. States
that are smaller and weaker are more likely to experience violent terrorist attacks than
stronger states by a 3:1 factor. This ratio increases to 5:1 when considering states’
dislodgement of residents, individual protests, fiscal changes, and security mechanisms.
Weaker states with moderate fiscal and social growth performances are more likely to
experience terrorist attacks compared to other weaker states (Tikuisis, 2009).
National security relationships with other agencies play a significant role in filling
the gaps to protect U.S. citizens. In principle, national security officials should refine
their priorities and methods, share a collective vision between all agencies, define roles
and duties within those agencies so communication is more effective, offer a rational
model for congressional oversight, and communicate their intent to the people at home
and overseas (Dale, 2013). Congress has carried out efforts, primarily through
proceedings, to obtain a better understanding of the landscape of terrorism in many states
and to measure the efforts of partnering agencies. Congress examined several platforms
and procedures regarding national peacekeeping efforts; connections between
transnational crime, drugs, and terrorism financing; and the link between homeland and
transnational terrorism events (Painter, 2013).
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Miller (2013) stated that changes in the last decade have been messy and sparse;
these changes have focused on an agency rather than the shared goal of all, and other
changes should be made. U.S. national security agencies seem to be lacking the skills
needed to communicate with others outside of their realm. Communication and sharing
should be an essential function of national security, but this function seems to have been
totally abandoned as reflected in sparse reforms (Miller, 2013).
The lone wolf threat is a concern to national security and the people of the United
States. The modern security landscape requires a detailed and resolute approach to
detecting and thwarting terrorist attacks (Valentin-Bogdan, 2013). This study provided a
better understanding of the factors that influence lone wolf terrorists to act violently. The
leaderless resistance model was the basis for examining the threat and dispelling the
mystique. The model provided a theoretical approach to address concerns related to lone
wolves.
Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this study was that lone wolf terrorism has received
considerable media attention, yet this phenomenon has not been sufficiently examined in
an academic study. FBI Director Robert Mueller (2003) reported that lone wolf terrorists
are the most difficult to identify before they act, and therefore pose a huge security
concern. Research regarding lone wolf terrorism has been limited (Arndt, 2011).
Traditionally, terrorism has been examined as a group activity, and scholars have focused
on group aspects and group socialization to explain individual pathways to terrorism
(Spaaij, 2010). Early research on lone wolf terrorism came from creeds of anarchist,
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including a review of unexpectedly scarce theoretical writings on the topic in English
(Feldman, 2013). The lone wolf problem was present 150 years ago, but now has become
a ubiquitous feature of western political and counterterrorism dialogue in recent years.
(Feldman, 2013). The lone wolf problem became evident when Theodore Kaczynski
acted outside of an established terrorist hierarchy, killing three individuals and injuring
23 others (Phillips, 2011). Lone wolf terrorists have since been taking advantage of
national security lapses. Although the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act included
provisions to protect against lone wolf threats, there is a need to understand the
underlying mechanisms and processes of the lone wolf. National security officials remain
concerned about the endurance of established terrorist hierarchies, but new trends point to
the increase of attacks by individuals and/or microcells who have very little, if any,
contact with established terrorist hierarchies (Michael, 2012).
The lone wolf terrorist’s ideology manifests in terrorist or radical actions.
National security officials and the FBI are aware of these manifestations but will not
formally list them as established terrorist hierarchies in the United States. Lone wolf
terrorists include individuals who act on their beliefs to support animal rights, the
environment, anarchism, White superiority, Black independence, anti-government, and
abortion. Since 9/11, lone wolf terrorists have been responsible for carrying out several
dozen attacks, and there seems to be an increase in the number of hate groups present
nationwide. Most of the hate groups’ acts seem to be focused on the government
(Bjelopera, 2012). A cohesive approach is needed to protect U.S. citizens (Dale, 2013).
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This problem is significant, and it invokes a sense of fear and dread. Lone wolf
terrorists act alone and have no constraints regarding violence levels. They are
unconcerned about what national security does before or after an attack, and prefer to
isolate their supporters. When they act alone, they are much harder to detect because no
other individual is aware of their intentions. Downing and Mayer (2013) asserted that
lone wolves are more dangerous than established terrorist hierarchies. There have been at
least 60 plots, 49 of which have been homegrown (Downing & Mayer, 2013). Individuals
or microcells are naturalized citizens, lawful permanent inhabitants, or guests.
The lack of cohesive communication among agencies has made it more difficult
for national security officials to detect lone wolves. The minimal literature on the lone
wolf phenomenon had made it difficult to understand the characteristics of lone wolves
and how they translate ideology into practice. This qualitative study addressed this gap
concerning lone wolves using secondary data analysis.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to focus on the lone wolf phenomenon apart from
other types of political violence and terrorism using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Database. Using the leaderless resistance
theory, this study was qualitative in nature and focused on the leaderless lone wolf
terrorist phenomenon including the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead
individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and act
unilaterally without direction toward violent ends. The literature provided insight into
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lone wolf terrorism and the changes that need to be made to address the security concern
through secondary data analysis.
Nature of the Study
The qualitative method was used to assess the lack of understanding of the
leaderless lone wolf terrorist phenomenon including the underlying mechanisms and
processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement
(TTSRL, 2008). Conducting qualitative research was a way to identify intangible factors,
such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose
role in the research may not be clear (see Creswell, 2009).
Research indicated that the process of self-radicalization of lone wolf terrorists
remains misunderstood and warrants further scientific research (Christensen, 2004).
Phillips (2011) discussed how understanding the individualistic nature of lone wolf
terrorism might require more subtlety from several economic-theoretical models that may
lend themselves to its analysis. Building on previous research, I used a qualitative
phenomenological design to explore the threat of lone wolves. Lone wolves follow a
pattern and are susceptible to exposure at some point in the process. Identifying this
process was essential to addressing the problem posed by these individuals (Bjelopera,
2012).
Research Questions
There are two types of research questions: central questions and sub questions.
Central questions are designed to explore the concept of the study or the central
phenomenon. Sub questions separate the central question into a relevant question
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(Creswell, 2009). The central research question in this study was as follows: What are the
underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from
an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent
ends? The sub questions (SQs) for this study were as follows:
SQ1: What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism?
SQ2: Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a
potential lone wolf actor?
Theoretical Framework
The framework used to guide this study was the leaderless resistance theory.
Essential to the leaderless resistance theory is the method of resistance that motivates
individuals or microcells to undertake acts of political violence separate from an
established hierarchy (Joosse, 2007). The relevance of this theory to this study was
ideological inclusiveness that leaderless resistance advocates. Although leaderless
resistance is used to avoid detection, ideological inclusiveness can be an advantage for
individuals involved in groups, such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), because of what
leaderless resistance advocates (Joosse, 2007).
According to Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013), little is known about the
nature of lone wolves and how everyone comes to this conclusion of violence. Once
agencies understand lone wolves’ characteristics and how they form their ideological
mindset, they will be able to collaborate to develop solutions, such as detecting the threat
and identifying individuals before their beliefs transforms into actions.
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Miller (2013) indicated that national security officials lack a cohesive tactical
planning model. The model national security uses are somewhat outdated and is not an
effective method of communication. Regarding national security, the intelligence
community focuses on the overall issue of terrorism and takes a reactive approach instead
of being proactive (Coaffee & Rodgers, 2008). National security’s structure and methods
are more than 60 years old and are not relevant to address the most recent security
concerns. The anxiety that U.S. citizens have been experiencing since 9/11 is calling for a
change in the system and communication methods of the national security apparatus
(Miller, 2013).
Leaderless terrorists do not follow the traditional methods of an established
terrorist hierarchy given the nature of their independence and fluid movements (Gray,
2013). The leaderless resistance theory assisted in exploring the motivational factors for
ideological resistance by an individual rather than by leaders from an established terrorist
hierarchy. This theory assumes that oppositional entities, such as the U.S. government,
are problematic to individuals’ survival, and therefore lone wolf terrorists use tactics to
oppose the entities. Although the tactics of a lone wolf vary depending upon the
circumstances and conditions, Dale (2013) indicated that leaderless resistance theory is
suitable for examining the characteristics, ideology, and threats to national security of
lone wolves in the United States. Leaderless resistance theory became important because
lone wolf terrorists like Joseph Paul Franklin and Ted Kaczynski were very discreet and
went years without being caught (Martinez, 2012). National security concerns are easier
to comprehend using leaderless resistance theory, and the concerns regarding lone wolf
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terrorism in United States are better understood when considering the factors that make
up the phenomenon.
Operational Terms
While conducting this research, I used many operational terms. The operational
terms and theoretical meanings relevant to study ensue.
Established terrorist hierarchy: Terrorist covert groups that organize along
similar lines of a terrorist organization (Anti-Defamation League, 2013).
FISA Act: “The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 prescribes
procedures for requesting judicial authorization for electronic surveillance and physical
search of persons engaged in espionage or international terrorism against the United
States on behalf of a foreign power” (Margulies, 2013, p. 7).
Leaderless resistance theory: Political Research Associates (2013) stated that
leaderless resistance or phantom cells generally refer to spontaneous, autonomous,
unconnected cells seeking to carry out acts of violence, sabotage, or terrorism against a
government or occupying military force.
Lone wolf terrorist: Andrews (2009) states that a “lone wolf terrorist is a person
who performs terrorism without direct orders or connections to any organization” (p. 1).
National security: National security is the obligation to preserve the survival of
the country by way of financial control, mediation, and political command (Sitek, 2013).
Phenomenon: “A fact or situation that is observed to exist or happen, esp. one
whose cause or explanation is in question” (Stampnitzky, 2013).
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RAND Terrorism Database: RAND Corporation has established and maintained a
database of terrorism events dating back to 1968, which contains comprehensive
information on international and domestic terrorism. Initially, RAND collected lone
incidents of international terrorism but started collecting and registering data on domestic
terror attacks in 1998 (RAND Terrorism Database [RTD], 2013).
Self-radicalization: “A process by which an individual or group comes to adopt
increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that (1) reject or
undermine the status quo or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions
of freedom of choice” (FBI, 2013, p. 4).
Assumptions
There were four assumptions related to this study: (a) I assumed that reexamining
existing data to understand findings from new perspectives would have value; (b) I also
assumed that collecting data on lone wolf individuals from selected databases would
require organizational approval due to sensitive information; (c) furthermore, I assumed
that prioritizing a concept or issue that was relevant in the original data may not be
relevant at the time of the current study; and (d) last, I assumed that the available data
were collected openly and ethically.
Limitations
One limitation of this study was the term terrorism. Terrorism is subject to
varying interpretations and perspectives: states, organizations, agencies, and individuals
define the term differently. Further, the problem of terrorism as it exists today defies the
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boundaries of historical jurisdictions. Additionally, this study was limited by the
challenges inherent in the reuse of qualitative data.
Scope and Delimitations
This study was limited to lone wolf terrorism in the United States. Lone wolf
terrorism outside of the United States was not considered. The database searches were
limited to acts of lone wolves. Group terrorism was not addressed in this study. The
rationale for this choice was that lone wolves formulate individual methods and strategies
that are different from those used in an established terrorist organization. Databases are
ideal for researching lone wolf acts, and many can be found on administration websites.
Due to challenges that arose when I conducted database searches, websites such as the
Department of Homeland Security and search engines such as Google Scholar were used
in the study.
Significance of the Study
The significance of lone wolf threats was addressed in recent studies (Spaaij,
2010). National security readiness enables agencies to collaborate to detect the lone wolf
threat. Although there is no common vision among agencies regarding the concept of
national security, many associates it with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and conventional military interaction (Dale, 2013). The purpose of the study was to
examine the lone wolf phenomenon apart from other types of political violence and
terrorism. The term lone wolf terrorism referred to terrorist activities carried out by
individuals separate from those carried out by terrorist networks. Qualitative data were
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analyzed to identify the characteristics of lone wolf terrorists and formulate a base of
knowledge for lone wolf terrorism.
Contributions to the base of knowledge included information addressing national
security’s concerns regarding terrorism threats and vulnerabilities. The exploratory
research design allowed me to examine the lone wolf phenomenon separate from the
group phenomenon. In addition, exploration of the psychological factors that influence
the lone wolf to act violently could help the United States develop stronger security
plans. According to the White House (2013), the President’s top concerns are keeping
Americans safe, making sure that U.S. values and ideas are preserved, securing the
country against current threats, fending off terrorist attacks, and allocating more
resources for stronger reaction and rebound capabilities.
Furthermore, the federal government and all other agencies should work together
as close partners in a national approach. Brooks (2011) maintained that an enormous
amount of work is required by Congress. The American people may need to be willing to
pay for more security by giving up certain civil liberties.
Lone wolves are vulnerable to detection during the process of planning and
executing the act. Many love wolves are unskilled and lack the knowledge, assets, and
training necessary to carry out the violent act. Although the Internet is a guide for
conducting attacks and making weapons, such as bombs, it cannot substitute for hands-on
experience training in the real world. For these reasons, many lone wolves will at some
point step out of their comfort zone (Bakker & de Graaf, 2010) and be identified or
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arrested before they can conduct an attack. To deter lone wolf attacks, national security
should take a collaborative approach:
National security officials and many other agencies across the federal
government, local and private sectors, local communities across the nation, and
overseas have worked hard since the 9/11 attacks to make this country better and
to alleviate and safeguard it against evolving threats, to lessen the risks, and
expand the capacity to react and rebound from attacks. (DHS, 2013)
A determined effort is needed to secure the United States from lone wolf terrorism while
protecting the basic liberties of citizens. Though threats remain, the United States is more
powerful now than before 9/11 and is better equipped to address evolving threats (DHS,
2013).
Implications for Social Change
There were four implications for social change because of this study. First,
findings may be used to inform the people about decreasing recognition than increasing
an environment of fear that threatens an aptitude of social cohesion. According to the
Lammers and Hickson (2013), social cohesion and synchronization are necessary to hold
people together in times of an emergency. A second implication for social change was to
present data on how the lack of approach to reducing this threat sends a message that
social cohesion is not important. A better understanding of lone wolf terrorism could help
the American people work together to mitigate the threat. A third implication for social
change was to improve communication about U.S. values. Fourth, reducing fear and
uncertainty about national security was is valuable long-term implication for positive
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social change. All the above-mentioned implications should foster social change for
national security and all intelligence agencies. The people of this nation can withstand
great progress and advances in the ways national security services are supplied on top of
improving national security reputation with all other agencies and the citizens of this
country. Likewise, Americans may become more informed toward the existing situation
and more doctrinally vested in the process.
Summary
The results of this qualitative secondary analysis study may improve
understanding of lone wolves’ characteristics. National security officials should adopt a
more cohesive approach to engage with other agencies to develop strategies to address
national security threats. Currently, the national security approach lacks cohesiveness and
overlooks the responsiveness of other federal and local agencies during an emergency or
terrorist attack. Changes to national security policy are needed to address the ongoing
threats of lone wolf terrorism. Chapter 2 provides a review of literature pertaining to lone
wolf terrorism, national security preparedness, and reasons why national security officials
are concerned.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The leaderless resistance theory illustrated that there is a lack of cohesiveness in
the national security approach, and national security officials and other government
entities should collaborate to develop strategies to address the growing threat of lone wolf
terrorism (Alexander, 2009). The U.S. media promotes lone wolf terrorism by stressing
fear and uncertainty despite a lack of examination of the lone wolf phenomenon. The
purpose of this study was to explore the phenomenon apart from other types of political
violence and terrorism using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base and the
Global Terrorism Database. This chapter is organized according to the themes that
emerged during the literature review. The themes in the literature search stemmed from
the theoretical framework of understanding the imbalance of power that manifests in lone
wolves surfacing as terrorists or radical extremists (Michael, 2012). The research
provided evidence of post-9/11 lone wolf terrorism in the United States, and the purpose
of this study was to enhance the U.S. national security approach to deal with the future
threats and attacks.
This chapter starts with the definition of terrorism as an ongoing threat, followed
by a review of existing literature and the gaps pertaining to lone wolf terrorism. The
chapter also presents the leaderless resistance theory from the 1960s. In addition, I
examine aspects of the phenomenon by assessing the practice, characteristics, and
paradigm of the government’s approach. A cohesive approach to national security is
presented that may help thwart threats and attacks. Chapter 2 concludes with the social
change mechanism concerning homeland terrorism.
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Lone Wolf: A Definition Melee
One issue when conducting research on the nature of this phenomenon was the
lack of a consistent definition. Terrorism has been defined in many ways, and there has
been no universal definition that all scholars have accepted. Government officials,
scholars, and other stakeholders use the term terrorism to illustrate different types of
violence, thereby diluting the meaning (Spencer, 2006).
Violent acts such as kidnapping, insurgent attacks, piracy, and guerilla warfare are
considered terrorist attacks. However, there is uncertainty surrounding the multifaceted
definition of terrorism, which is evident in the models used to detect it, and which is seen
in the debates that take place in national security conferences (Rapin, 2011). If the United
States and the international community could agree on a collective definition of
terrorism, the exclusion clauses under the 1951 Geneva Convention would establish
standards of international law comprising of terrorism (Simeon, 2010).
The lack of a clear definition of this phenomenon has prompted many debates.
According to Smyth (2009), a taped conversation with Letta Tayler, senior researcher of
Human Rights Watch, indicated that government authorities have largely contested views
on terrorism because no one knows exactly what it really is, and it is broadly defined.
When questioned about the impact and results of the war on terror, Tayler (as cited in
Smyth, 2009) stated that terrorism undercuts regulations, customs, and communal safety.
Mazhar, Khan, and Goraya (2013) noted that terrorism can be defined as violent
behavior that is motivated politically on behalf of individuals, groups, or states. The
purpose of terrorism is to instill fear in the opposition and its population to influence
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decisions and change their behaviors. A collective definition of terrorism is essential to
any real fight on terrorism. A neutral definition should be founded on established
international regulations and doctrines pertaining to the behaviors that are allowed in
conventional wars among states (Boaz, 2010). The issue of trying to define the term has
had a philosophical predisposition in the continuing melee (Acharya, 2008).
More recently, Jackson (as cited in Stump, 2013) tried to rewrite the definition of
terrorism, but not without major criticism. Critics pointed out that Jackson’s attempt to
redefine terrorism was expressed from a closed-minded perspective that limited the
capacity to logically study terrorism (Althied, 2006). Second, critics believed Jackson
considered terrorism a type of bizarre violence, which has led some researchers to
prejudge the phenomenon and overlook relevant and prominent features of terrorism.
Critics said the way Jackson approached terrorism was not sufficient for terrorism studies
and did not provide a systematic structure for researchers studying terrorism (Stump,
2013).
No matter the circumstance or event, nations and governments define terrorism
from the perspective of their organizations. The definition used by the U.S. government
describes terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (CIA, 2013, p. 1).
Based on this definition, the language involving terrorist attacks are very similar. The
only differing factor involves the location of the attack, which can include international
or domestic. The understanding of terrorism is difficult for reasons other than the
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definition. Since 9/11, characteristics of terrorism have changed. Studies have not only
addressed the strategies, but have also addressed the characters involved (Gilly, 2013).
Review of Literature
The need to review the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead the lone
wolf terrorist to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement has far-reaching
security concerns. The review of literature provided insight into lone wolf terrorism and
the changes that need to be made to address the security concern. The DHS (2011)
reported lone wolf terrorism to be the most prevalent threat domestically. In addition,
Spaaij (2010) stated that the term lone wolf was given to White racists who used the
tactic to bring about change. There is growing concern for national security to detect
prospective terrorists and to prepare citizens from horrific terrorist events. National
security officials should understand how these individuals think and operate to save lives
and apprehend the individuals who may commit such acts. It is critical for the
government and intelligence agencies to identify a pattern and expose lone wolf
terrorists.
Bates (2012) stated that the consequence of being unprepared leads to casualties
and property destruction, which poses a security concern. Although effective security
measures are in place, the development of leaderless resistance methods and tactics are
facilitated through the advancement of technology (Bates, 2012). Terrorism comes in
different forms and structures and the lone wolf terrorist has formed a personal and
political impasse. Domestically, radical extremists cause a challenging and urgent threat
to U.S. national security.
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Lieberman and Collins (2011) assessed that the role of national security involves
the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and direct coordination from the federal and local governments. It is very
important for agencies to coordinate and use proper training during the investigative
process. Legal ethics training aims to elude any violations of human rights and decisions
that otherwise may violent civil freedoms. (Bryneilson et al., 2013). Many factors are
involved when an individual decides to act alone or be a part of an established terrorist
hierarchy (Nijboer, 2012).
Stewart (2011) said it is very challenging to separate extremists who have every
intention to commit terror acts oppose to those who just voice their opinion of hate.
National security officials use unlimited resources and time searching for individuals who
maybe transitioning their extreme beliefs into actions. This is a frightening assignment
assuming the enormous number of potential suspects. Achieving this goal requires
consistent engagement from communities and businesses, and it is important for everyone
to do their part by reporting potential individuals to national security officials (Cooper,
2012).
Evidently, this has had some effect. The growing threats of lone wolf terrorism
domestically has forced security officials to contend with the facts that radicalization
develops here in the United States (Levitt, 2017). Barnes (2012) asserted that present
security techniques focuses on the culpabilities and liabilities designed for group
interactions, a deterrent method to terrorism that is unsuitable to the lone wolf terrorist.
However, most lone wolves are unskilled and the act never fully develops. The same
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characteristics that make lone wolves difficult to apprehend also reduces the damage that
can be done (Barnes, 2012).
Armed forces have minimized the terrorism threat from overseas (Barnes, 2012).
The homeland threat has come from unidentified individuals who use violence to express
their beliefs and opinions. Recently, domestic terrorism effects had been felt on April 15,
2013, when brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev dropped two pressure-cooker
bombs near the finish line of the Boston marathon race, killing three and injuring an
estimated 264 people. Over the past several years lone wolf terrorism has been the
media’s primary dialogue.
Gaps in Literature
The lone wolf threat has been always relevant, but the element of this
phenomenon has not been sufficiently examined. Academic scholars hypothesize whether
the phrase has provoked a sense of fear and dread, and how much does the media
contributes to a certain degree, based upon the threat of the mystique (Stewart, 2011).
However, when looking at the lone wolf history, there is a significant gap between lone
wolf theory and lone wolf practice. To put the lone wolf threat into the proper context, an
assessment of this gap would be very helpful, and doing so would provide an
understanding of the lone wolf phenomenon and their history (Stewart, 2011). The media
must have a different approach to lone wolf terrorism when trying to dispel the mystique
and address the problems lone wolves pose. Common sense and knowledge implies that
accomplishing this objective is not simple.
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O’Donnell and Gray (2012) mentioned that terrorism expert Brian M. Jenkins
expressed that “Terrorism is a Theatre,” and that the media is its greatest resource and
cause. When an attack or act occurs the media continuously show its viewers narrative
scenes from the activity. Jenkins argued that this was witnessed twice throughout the
world, during the 1972 Olympics and the September 11, 2001, attacks (O’Donnell &
Gray, 2012). The media can counter opposing terrorism methods by limiting the amount
of coverage shown on terrorist activities. As technology has emerged, information via
media outlets are accessible to almost anyone around the world.
Terrorist’s propaganda and websites are being viewed on Face book, Twitter, and
YouTube, to inform, discover, and interact with the potential lone wolf terrorists. The
media, even after the September 11 attacks, caused confusion regarding the unsettling
political situation surrounding Iran’s nuclear plants and Edward Snowden’s release of
classified information (Greenwald, 2014). Though these are ongoing events, the media
would be purposely driven, given their considered attention to the Middle East, to
highlight the chaos characterized by religious clashes and democratic opposition.
People’s reaction to the media coverage of terrorism varies, but it does have an
everlasting effect on them. Shoshani and Slone (2008) did a study and assessed the
reactions of 300 Israeli adults. The individuals were randomly chosen and they either
watched terrorism or non-terrorism related media on television. What they found was that
emotional and attitudinal reactions to terrorism in the media were a lot higher than those
on the non-terrorism media viewers. These findings reveal how a considerable amount of
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media coverage can significantly affect an individual’s emotional and attitudinal
reactions through the persuasion of media (Shoshoni & Slone, 2008).
Terrorist attacks get considerable media attention. Those that are specific and
surprising, creating high levels of uncertainty and the perception of a severe threat, define
disaster situations (Saunter & Carafano, 2012). The September 11 terrorist attacks were
clearly defined as a disaster, and people agree that it was one the most disastrous in
modern U.S. history. It is important to understand the traumatic effect of these situations
and how they can be prevented or reduced. The media has not realized how much lone
wolf terrorists are counting on them, to lead their cause. The more the situation demands
a question from memory, the more likely an inaccurate response will be made (Lindsay,
2011).
Michael (2013) noted that the Internet is prevalent and serves a variety of
purposes. Those issues stem from social issues, emergencies, and or disastrous situations.
Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda use the Internet and other media outlets for propaganda
reasons. Research shows both the positive and negative aspects of media related
terrorism, yet, terrorist propaganda mirror the effect of the domestic self-radicalized lone
wolf. This involves no communication or direct links to establish terrorist organizations,
as well as taken advantage of the new media platform (Howie, 2012).
Guterman (2013) focused on terrorism and media but centered the approach on
how Muslims are portrayed in the media. The media is very careful and maneuvers
through dangerous grounds, to not cause further controversy, or use bias overtones
regarding Muslim relations in this state, per Muslim Americans. Guterman, however, did
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not go into details of why they might feel that way and why some resents Americans,
leading to an increase in lone wolf terrorism activities here in the states.
Historical Perspective
Lone wolf terrorism is not a new phenomenon. This is factual of modern terrorist
acting like past anarchists and their extremist views and agendas. Individuals who
expressed their radical beliefs and used violence as a result were likely motivated by
mental distress and poverty (Kassel, 2009). In the beginning, terrorism was not a choice
of violence. Terrorism came about because of stressful economic conditions, public
fighting, and government suppression of diplomatic controlled practices and
demonstrations, which led to the creation of anarchist motivation. This started a domino
effect of social resentment, suppression, and retaliation. Although readings show a
greater period where information could have been quantifiably examined, the trail of
terrorist activities could be traced back from four decades (Rasler & Thompson, 2009).
In the U.S. from about the 1960’s and beyond, the leaderless resistance model was
associated with White supremacists and people who were against the government.
Political Research Associates (2013) associated the term “leaderless resistance” to
impulsive, self-ruling, unknown, or identified individuals trying to commit acts of
violence, or terrorism toward a government or government entity. The term is frequently
credited to Louis Beam, an American white nationalist, but Beam gives praise to Ulius
“Pete” Louis Amoss, a U.S. intelligence officer who wrote about leaderless resistance in
1953. The term is used in numerous of ways to refer to individuals or networks, which
causes confusion. Comparatively, leaderless resistance was associated with individuals
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that engage with cells and lack the hierarchical command associations (Political Research
Associates, 2013).
Research Strategy
The following databases were used in conducting the literature search: RAND
Database of Worldwide Terrorism incidents (RDWTI), Post-9/11 Terrorism Database,
Data Collections-Start-National Consortium for The Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, and ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Additional websites such as The
Department of Homeland Security and Google Scholar was also used. The following
keywords were asserted: terrorism, loner, lone wolf terrorism, lone wolf, lone wolf
terrorist, domestic terrorism, terrorism threats, stray mutts, and self-radicals.
Recommendations from the keyword articles led to discovering more resources. Those
resources found was directly associated with lone wolf terrorists or lone wolf terrorism.
This assessment highlighted lone wolf terrorism and their threats in the homeland.
Theoretical Framework
The leaderless resistance concept formed the theoretical base for setting aside the
mystique of the lone wolf to examine the reality of the phenomenon. The concept offered
a theoretical approach that personifies concerns related to lone wolves, which are those
acting outside of known, identified and/or established leadership hierarchy. It focused on
what causes individuals to unilaterally take violent actions in the name of a political or
social cause. Similar studies used leaderless resistance as their framework to explain the
phenomenon as a new strategy to show the diminishment of terrorist and insurgent
movements internationally (Michael, 2012). This study focused on the phenomenon—
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distinguishing them from other types of violence and terrorism (Michael, 2012). The
leaderless resistance concept is the idea strategy model of opposition and guide
individuals or micro groups to fully participate unilaterally in any established leadership
hierarchy. While leaderless resistance is used to shun detection, penetration, and trial by
the state, the problem manifests and individuals become immune to counter-ideology
(Joosse, 2007). It is when this process is identified that national security officials can
collaborate and foster solutions on how to approach this growing threat. This is the point
where all securing officials create a plan for lone wolf terrorism.
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) was created as a
project to tackle the most complex problems facing our nation, such as terrorism (RTD,
2013). The leaderless resistance theory illustrated that there is a lack of cohesiveness
movement within and relies on the unilateral approach. This made it easier to
differentiate between individuals and organizations, which assisted in identifying
characteristics of lone wolf terrorists. Atran (2006) stated unity is not always promising,
especially after seeing the leaderless resistance transformation of Jihadist networks in the
wake of diminishing group networks.
Although it is not in the best interest to overstate the engagements of leaderless
resistance, leaderless resistance as a concept is broadly talked about. The fact that the
attacks are so far and few in between makes it a complex task to understand the “how” of
lone wolf terrorism. Seeking information that pertains to this terrorist threat is important
to finding few answers to the many questions that go unanswered (Bakker & de Graff,
2010).
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According to Steward (2011), for all who have been paying attention to the news
as of late, the media has been overwhelmed with a steady stream of statements regarding
lone wolf terrorists:
While many of these statements, such as those from President Barack Obama,
Vice President Joseph Biden and Department of Homeland Security Director
Janet Napolitano, were made in the days leading up to the 10th anniversary of the
9/11 attacks, they did not stop when the threats surrounding the anniversary
proved to be unfounded and the date passed without incident. Indeed on Sept. 14,
the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen, told CNN
that one of the things that concerned him most was finding that next lone-wolf
terrorist before he strikes. (p.1)
One reason the leaderless resistance model is advocated is because it creates fear and
uncertainty. There is a belief that at some point, lone wolf terrorists will not have the
choice of network affiliation.
Leaderless resistance theory is useful and relevant to explore the factors that
influence, contribute, and justify an individual pathway to terrorism. This model further
examined the advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of using the leaderless
resistance model is that it makes lawsuits and prosecutions (Civil and RICO) more
complex. However, by using this model, the lone wolf is not able to sustain key
methodological objectives because of a lack of coordination. Leaderless resistance theory
demonstrates how the following has become dysfunctional and unorganized. It also
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demonstrates that there are few established leadership hierarchies that would be
recognized within the general population.
The leaderless resistance theory has evolved from Islamist threat. The value of
using the leaderless model is that it puts the threat into context. The leaderless resistance
theory presented ways to address how lone wolf terrorism came about, thus offering a
unique opportunity to understand the issues that impose a great deal of pain among the
masses. This study addressed the insufficient examination of this phenomenon
formulated by the theory versus its practice. The decision to study lone wolf terrorism
was compelled by less attacks at home being grouped (organizations), making it difficult
for national security to stop the violence and mayhem from increasing domestically.
Conveying the correct information is a critical step in dismissing the mystique and
addressing the problems posed by such individuals in a realistic and rational way.
The examination of literature to understand how the leaderless resistance theory
relates to lone wolf terrorist in the U.S. was considered by their very own nature. Other
theoretical models considered included the Van Gelder (2013) rational choice model,
which considers the cost versus benefits of crime focusing on the individual’s decision
making. Mose’s (2010) model reviewed the role of attitudes in bad behavior for
participants with multiple problems, such as anger and psychological impairment. They
both identified potential reasons of why, but neither accentuated the attacks are less
vulnerable to the traditional methods of national security.
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Leaderless Jihad: The Modern Face of Terror
Muslim extremists account for a small number within the population. If a small
number of Muslims account for a small percentage, then why are many juvenile Muslims
led to extremist versions of Islam through grassroots radical establishments within their
social community? What makes them become extremists? How can violent extremism be
fought and routed? In Marc Sageman’s book, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the
Twenty First Century, he discussed all the above questions. Marc Sageman, who is a
counterterrorism consultant and forensic psychiatrist, provided a thorough consider the
current global Islamist terrorist threat, exploring its progression from the 1980s through
the latest wave of terrorism (Arndt, 2011).
Waugh (2006) noted how, in the book Leaderless Jihad, Sageman continuously
fills in and adds to his prior work on what causes extremist elements of terrorism within
their social community. He also noted that Sageman’s work is unique, because of his
“data –based” approach to al-Qaeda’s study. Throughout the book, he organized
individual terrorist profiles to garner data in relation to their characteristics, psychological
factors, risk factors, and mindsets. The al-Qaeda-led Islamist terrorist following
contained thousands of individuals. It is comprised of terrorist networks that got together
in route to terrorism. The networks may perhaps develop into official organizations like
al-Qaeda due to shifting circumstances (Alexander, 2009).
Even though al-Qaeda’s core is centered alongside the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, the radicalized terror following has evolved and grown beyond its grassroots
origination (Gartenstein-Ross, 2009). Today’s al-Qaeda and terrorist networks have an
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offspring as the result of several chronological terrorism cycles. The veterans of antiSoviet following in Afghanistan, who collaborated with Osama bin Laden, were the first
cycle of al-Qaeda’s following in the 1980s. Individuals who went and trained through alQaeda’s training camps comprised the second wave of followers. Al-Qaeda’s core was
major during this cycle, personally sending their terrorists all over the world (Said, 2012).
Cox (2009) said nonetheless, the third wave, are the individuals who emerged in
the post 9/11 era, those who connected to the al-Qaeda following during the outing of the
Taliban when U.S. led invasions into Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has lost many of its
training camp facilities and the locations where they were once deemed safe. But their
social following is more encompassing than before due to the global use of the Internet,
where the organization has had success in radicalizing a new breed of individuals,
including many who are among the second-following of Muslim individuals in North
America and Europe. These were the followers, for example, that went and carried out
terrorist acts on the London’s transportation system in July 2005.
Sageman wrote that the third wave of individual followers feel that they are
heroes, regardless of right or wrong, and therefore they transitioned during this cycle:
Sageman asserted, the course of their radicalization is a result of an
individual’s logic to what he perceives his affliction to be of what his fellow
Muslim followers are going through around the world; no matter if his affliction
is in grievance with his own experience, for instance, obscurity in making the
West and, at last, organized networks that lead individuals sequentially to violent
radicalization by using terrorist cells (Tucker, 2010, p.1).
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Sageman suggested making terrorism less eventful as an alternative method to the
social following movement encouraged by al-Qaeda (Sustein, 2008). Juvenile Muslims
can be better suited if they are a part of the solution to resolve the local clashes that are
intensified by al-Qaeda’s propaganda in the Muslim community. Juvenile Muslims are
deemed heroes if they join the movements, so they should have alternative choices and
individual freedom without being force or manipulated in joining al-Qaeda’s movement.
Shift Toward Leaderless Resistance
There is no doubt that the threat of lone wolf terrorism is serious, but one must
first recognize its history. To say lone wolf terrorism has been in existence forever is like
saying it is a natural part of society. History has shown that lone wolf terrorism today is
very similar to past terrorism that emerged in the 1800s, when fixated individuals like
Leon Czolgosz were so adamant on changing the political situation. Leon Czolgosz, the
anarchist who assassinated U.S. President William McKinley in 1901, was a lone wolf,
according to the University of Buffalo (2013).
In 1971, The National Alliance was created by a White supremacist who called
for the segregation of whites from others, specifically Jews (National Alliance, 2011).
The National Alliance is a network dedicated to advancing the ideas of the deceased
founder William Pierce, whose core beliefs are strictly in the realm of white supremacy.
William Pierce was one of the defendants of Fort Smith in 1989 that wrote a novel titled
Hunter, in tribute to a fictitious lone wolf. The book was intended to be a guiding treatise
for lone wolves like Joseph Paul Franklin, to whom the book was, dedicated (National
Alliance, 2011).
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According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) (2013), Richard Kelly Hoskins
was another white supremacist, but he was not as well-known as William Pierce. Hoskins
was a financial advisor in Virginia, and he advocated for racism for nearly five decades,
reasoning for the far right during the last two decades. He wrote many Christian-based
commentaries that were popular at supremacist symposiums and sanctuaries. He was
well-known for the concept of “Phineas Priesthood.” Those were white supremacists that
used violence to retaliate crime against the white race.
Louis Beam, a Fort Smith defendant that hated the government, developed
concepts in an essay entitled “Leaderless Resistance” in 1992. The essay contained an
orthodox pyramid scheme of an organization and he thought it was not only useless but
also very dangerous. He supported and argued that it was best to continue the military
and ideological fight through independent cells (Beutel, 2007). The movement or
following has not flourished the way white supremacists like Pierce, Hoskins, and Beam
envisioned it. Even before the 9/11 attacks, several decades had gone by since the rise of
leaderless resistance. The success of lone wolf attacks has faltered due to the penetration
of the government; this is exactly why those leaders shifted to the leaderless resistance to
further the White supremacy agenda.
To date, the leaderless resistance model is not only used by the far-right wing, but
the left wing adopted a similar model as well. They specifically supported the Earth
Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). The ELF and its
partnering network, the ALF, is environment friendly and against the progression of
manufacturing if it is not for the bettering of the environment and animals (Anti-
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Defamation League, 2013). ELF and ALF are very smart and dissimilar to Islamic
terrorists. They want people to see what they are doing, unlike others, and they would
rather attack property than people. The crimes are usually associated with burnings and
property damage.
Bjelopera (2011) stated, over the last decade, jihadists for some of the same
reasons have taken a leaderless resistance approach. The group approach from al-Qaeda
has transformed into a leaderless approach. The twenty-first century of Islamic terror
networks seems to be more loose, self-regulating, and have more random entities than
their prior groups, who were a part of the September 11 atrocities. The concept has gone
from the network of top al Qaida officials, scheming enormous resources and giving
orders, to a huge number of low network members that are trying to execute leaderless
jihad from the bottom up.
Lone wolf terrorists may not be physically supported or have the guidance of
figureheads from a network, but they form a very violent social following using the
Internet. Terrorism has always been associated with the Middle East and other countries
across seas; yet, it has migrated to Western countries. The challenge in the twenty-first
century for governments is trying to stay one step ahead to detect and neutralize these
individuals before they become violent. To have any type of success against the threat
that is very much real and dangerous, the process must first be understood, which has
consequences for Western governments if they cannot detect the threat during the process
(Sedgwick, 2012).
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Lone Wolf: Characteristics, Psychological Factors, Risk Factors, and Mindset
Finalized reports from research summaries have shown that lone wolf terrorists who
individually commit solo acts of terror on their own behalf, away from established
terrorist organizations, constitute a growing threat toward U.S. national security. The
characteristics of lone wolf attacks have prompted differing assessments upon
commutative reports. Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013) stated that far-right
extremist usually consist of the military, the least to marry, those who envision dying at
the scene of the crime, hanging out alone, firing weapons, shooting multiple victims, and
choosing government targets. These same characteristics are also the distinguishing
factors from each other.
Lone wolf acts, in comparison, are more significant and have brought a new sense
of a new awareness from national security. The U.S. government examined the
characteristics regarding lone wolves in two forms: school attackers and assassins
(McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). The results revealed that lone wolves were
mainly white males, and both groups of individuals were dominant lone perpetrators.
Conversely, military service, marriage, and education varied in relation to assassins than
school attackers. They seemed to be older, or adults that had more years of opportunity to
achieve entering the military, getting married, or getting a degree versus the school
attackers (McCauley et al (2013). The other demographic characteristics, as documented
by McCauley et al (2013), are also displayed in Table 1.
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Table 1
Themes Derived from the Data Analysis of Lone Wolf Characteristics
School
attackers
N=41

Assassins
N=83

81

70

100

86

Caucasian

76

77

Age range

11-21

16-73 (M=35)

Served in military

01

55

Never married

1001

492

High school education or less

1001

54

Ever arrested

27

66

History of substance abuse

24

39

783

44

Lone Actor
Male

History of depression or despair
1

Percentage assumed, not explicit in School Report

2

Corrected percentage, 41/83=49%, where Assassins Report gives 51%

3

Percentage reported having suicidal thoughts or suicidal attempts
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As reported above, school attackers are much younger than assassins. The U.S.
government report shows no military entry for school attackers compared to about 50%
of assassins. Forty-nine percent of assassins had never married in comparison to school
attackers who never married. Both groups’ criminal records differ greatly. Not knowing
assassins’ arrest records as teenagers makes it difficult to interpret. Depression, despair,
and a history of suicidal thoughts vary tremendously with school attackers (78%) and
assassins. Surprisingly, school attackers had a higher percentage, although assassins were
much older and had more of an opportunity to achieve such things (McCauley et al.,
2013).
Psychological Factors
Three psychological factors emerged as contributors to the radicalization of lone
wolves: group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics
(King & Taylor, 2011). The lone wolf terrorist seems to feel some sort of deprivation,
which is essentially the mind-set that occurs because of feeling not equal, in a sense, and
unspoken within a group of individuals. This concept was first seen in Stoufer et al.’s
(2005) work about no formal explanation of the concept or course of action regarding its
examination. Crosby (2006) had a different explanation and his reviews emphasized the
concept of relativeness: deprivation is felt in relation to others with the aim of comprising
a reference group (Barcena-Martin, Imedio-Olmedo, and Martin-Reyes, 2007).
Identity conflicts can be inspired by many things, but identity regarding a
religious following is known to be amongst the most intriguing, due to the holy views
they are associated with. Religion is associated with the spiritual uplifting of an
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individual, bringing out a person’s sense of belonging and conviction; it also leads to
small-mindedness, prejudices, and radical aggressiveness (Agbiboa, 2013). Each of us
sees the world from a different perspective and this can cause conflicts, especially when
individual can only view the world from his or her perspective.
Merari, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, and Zakin (2010) had shown major differences
between personality characteristics that were found between lone wolves that were and
were not suicidal terrorists. There were two central personality characteristics found
among the would-be suicides. One group of lone wolves were found to have low levels of
strength and were independent and had an anti-social personality, a characteristic that
made them less likely to be in a group and least likely to have social influence. Others
were examined as being emotional and/or having a deranged life style.
Risk Factors
Because of the perceived threats of lone wolf’s post 9/11, The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has nullified counter-terror measures, and work is ongoing to
expand others. Lone wolf terrorists are flexible and tend to shift their strategies, methods,
and events when countermeasures are put into place, different from normal or unplanned
man-made disasters. When trying to gage the lone wolf, it is difficult due to the limited
data which makes it hard to confront the threat. Examining the lone wolf terrorist groups
operating outside of the established leadership hierarchy is a challenge for all securing
officials (Lemieux & Regens, 2012).
DiRenzo and Das (2012) used the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) and found that
state revenue has a major relationship connection when evaluating the terrorist risk, after
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considering all other implications that were associated with terrorism. The findings urged
them to look at the GTI data variables to further examine the relationship between
revenue and income. Particularly, state revenue was found to be a major correlation with
other states’ counter-terrorism measures or the deterrence risk factors. The debate is that
states with more money have larger capabilities to employ counter-terrorism and security
measures than states with less money.
According to Schmid and Jongman’s classic book, Political Terrorism, the grassroots origin of terrorism lays in oppression. Many scholars have given different advice in
relation to risk factors for lone wolf terrorism. Many focused-on group followings, the
individual’s state of mind, their environment, or economic conditions. However, many
talk about the oppression as an annoyance. Walter Laqueur distinctively said that
oppression and terrorism are conversely linked (Victoroff, Adelamn, & Stern, 2006).
Mindset
White (2010) said that the mindset of lone wolf terrorist involves his or her
logical and responsive nature on the topic of a given situation or threat. This element is
the first phase of decision making and included the terrorist who may be at the forefront
and center of the situation and must decide to either participate, or not get involved with
the situation at hand (perceived threat). If he or she chooses to not get involved, then he
or she will bypass the following issue. However, if they choose to participate in the
situation at hand, they must follow through and evaluate how they are going to attack this
threat. When they feel comfortable and ready to take on with what they perceive to be a
threat, this is when their confidence will rise and allow them to begin the next phase.
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Lone wolf terrorists are believed to commit terrorist acts because of various
motivational factors. It is well-known that established terrorist organizations employ
social and psychological strategies to brainwash individuals into their ideological
mindset. They use strategies to convince and simplify the phenomenon around the
individual. Because of the individuals’ likely economic and social conditions, it is only a
matter of time before these strategies begin to work and these individuals become
terrorists. Nonetheless, it mirrors the effects of motivational factors in becoming a lone
wolf terrorist (Eren, 2007).
Basibuyuk, Karakus, and Akdogan (2007) noted fundamentalism is associated
with the mindset or base, especially when it comes to religion:
It is referred to as the core template. This is one of the most debated concepts
among scholars and theologians. When a person is looking from the outside in,
fundamentalism is usually associated with being stigmatized, a scornful title
“associated with private, coldblooded, and strict behavior.” Equally, carrying the
title of a fundamentalist can also be a foundation of morality and superiority for
exclusives who like to see themselves as showing pure faith in obeying religious
commands.
Even though fundamentalism can be related to concepts or a set of identities or be viewed
as a collective phenomenon, it also has an individual element and perception.
Lone Wolf: The Most Significant Threat to U.S. National Security
Over the next several years, the most significant homeland terrorism threat will
come from the lone wolf terrorist. They are inspired by established terrorist organizations
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but act on the peripheries of those movements (Kouri, 2011). With all the mayhem
subsiding in the Muslim communities, established terrorist organizations will attempt to
recruit more individuals on behalf of their organization. These unknown and unidentified
individuals are mysterious to leadership within terrorist organizations, but these
individuals present the most significant threat to the U.S. It is assumed, because of
international cooperation and collaboration in the realm of international terrorism, there
will be a further decline in group terrorism. Sagers Herzog (2013) said to make no
mistake, lone terrorist threats are and will continue to be the most significant threat to
national security.
One thing terrorist organizations have done was collaborate with each other and
will continue to do so to accomplish their desired end goal against the U.S. These
organizations might be bound by range, but their free lancing will challenge the U.S.
government to counter the threats and/or attacks. Al-Qaeda and their loose associations
will continue to be the most significant threat over the next several years, according to
Mike Snopes, who is head of a security firm and a former police commander in New
York (Lasky, 2012). The FBI (2013) predicts that administrative districts and agencies
outside of the government will have a growing role in world events for future years to
come, showing new disproportional threats to the U.S.
The U.S. may take the lead in trying to thwart the lone wolf threat and/or attacks,
but other nations will likely play a critical role. Governments are going to have to extend
some control through capital resources, services, and employees (Preble, 2011). The
administrative districts and agencies outside of government will likely be first responders.
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Despite the limited resources, it does not cost much for lone wolves carry out attacks. For
example, James Holmes, who is an American, entered a movie theatre in Colorado and
killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 50 in his lone melee. When the attacks
are successful, they usually are high-profile, very dangerous attacks, and their plan is
extremely challenging to detect. With the globalization of technology that continues to
network world economies, the economies will become more reliant on each other in years
to come. Some parts of the country will stabilize, but the income gap between nations and
cities are likely to make some countries and individuals a hotbed for terrorism.
As national concepts and boundaries become more complex and global, the
distinction between national and international themes will blur. This will threaten
national security by creating and linking national and international terrorist prospects or
criminal organizations. Most scholars say the more technology is developed, the more it
will have a profound effect on the collective ability of governments to protect this nation.
With current technology advances, the process is transforming and will continue to
transform. The U.S. and other countries are going through the most significant global
transformation. The U.S. has seen no other like it since it went from an agriculture nation
to an industrial nation. The transformation and technological advances allow lone wolf
terrorists to access many things like weapons technology unlike the pre-Internet era
(McComb, 2013).
Shea (2013) stated that technological advances have allowed lone wolves to stay
one step ahead of national security. For example, stories have been on the news in
relation to individuals purchasing poisonous gases or biological warfare agents, and how
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challenging it was for national security officials to trace where the specific agent was
bought. In the 21st Century, terrorism is no longer associated with the Middle East; it has
no confinement to any territory and neither do the criminals. Instead, they see this as a
major opportunity (Asal, Ackerman, & Rethemeyer, 2012).
Lieber and Press (2013) talked about how nuclear weapons and terrorist acts have
already been a topic of discussion, but this discussion is expected to increase
considerably. With what we already know about terrorist tactics, the expectation for them
to try to secure nuclear weapons is something that is feared and dreaded. Technological
advances made it simpler to move nuclear material around the world. As with the iPhone,
the basics of nuclear science and technologies are more easily understood, enabling
terrorists to produce nuclear weapons. Similarly, basic materials are readily assessable to
obtain (Mauroni, 2013). Terrorist threats in the homeland have only scratched the surface
and will continue in the U.S. for the next several years. The once-proud tradition of farleft groups who tried to overthrow the U.S. government because of the manufacturing
advances seems to have gone away in recent years. However, new individuals or groups
have emerged that can amass new threats.
The states that perceive the U.S. to be their biggest threat or rival will likely
remain that way or increase that perception. The most looked-for U.S. targets will be
governmental and armed forces’ strategies and objectives, expertise, and capital
establishments; individually, governmental and non-governmental. Intelligence officials
from other nations will increase their targeting scheme to recruit U.S. personnel overseas
by using informal techniques and collections methods to further their agenda (Klein,
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2012). With the advancement and secure methods of technology, intelligence officials
from other nations will use this method to draw upon individuals and to characterize the
procurement of secure technology methods to discreetly post all over the United States.
How the Theory Translates into Practice
Emerging lone wolves will be able to be more discreet, making it more complex
for national security officials and intelligence agencies to apprehend them. More recently,
this can be illustrated by examples such as the Washington Navy Yard shooter Aaron
Alexis, and Umar Abdulmutallab, the Christmas day bomber who had hidden explosives
taped into his underwear in 2009. These attacks are less costly, but they are very violent
and dangerous. Lone wolves and micro-cells do present sole challenges, but transforming
beliefs into actions has proven to be difficult. For every Timothy McVeigh and Nidal
Hasan, there is an Umar Abdulmutallab, the lone wolf that fails often due to a lack of
resources, faulty structure, or the fact that they are apprehended before the attack can
occur.
Very seldom are there lone wolves who have the skills, will, and the combination
of resources to carry out a successful lone wolf attack. When they can translate theory
into practice, the result is success. Failed attacks are associated with irresponsibility and a
lack of patience and skill. The lone wolf frequently miscalculates the attack and does not
have a good assessment of the target, which is often far beyond their capabilities. When
they attempt something that is beyond their measures, it often results in a complete
botched attempt (Pantucci, 2011).
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Teich (2013) mentioned that the ability to become a lone wolf does not require
any skill or experience. All that is required is simply a resistance to a lifestyle and the
ability to carry out attacks. Those skills and experience can only come with time, and the
best chance for success lies in small victories. Small victories fare better than one giant
blotched attempt, which may likely be his or her last attempt as a lone wolf. Every second
and every level of resistance counts. Information is the key and successful attacks align
with planning accordingly and avoiding prior mistakes by their predecessors.
Since the attacks are individually manned respectively, he or she is exposed to
detection at some point in the process and therefore must avoid riskier situations, like
being detected by cameras, to reduce the risk of detection (Stratford Analysis, 2011). It
takes more effort in to bomb a large building than using a meek box cutter knife.
Although the latter does not require much effort, the lone wolf still must plan the steps.
The advantage of using the leaderless resistance is that there is little to no
communication, which complicates the process.
Acting alone simply requires a lot of time, self-training, and for him or her to
collect all the required resources prior to an attack. Considering what it takes and requires
for an individual to transform a belief into action (lone wolf theory to practice), there are
not many individuals who possess these skills to carry out attacks. It can be concluded, in
part, why this theory has been around so long and why there have not been more attacks,
despite the fact of the media polarization (Andrews, 2009).
Undoubtedly, lone wolves do present a threat, but that threat should not be
exaggerated or ignored. Lone attackers are not mythological individuals that impose
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harm. Lone wolves follow a process and are vulnerable to detection. Examining the
phenomenon is a critical step in dismissing the mystique and addressing the problems
posed by lone wolves in a rational and practical way.
Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism
In the realm of homeland security, there has always been the following question:
do we sacrifice individual freedom to prevent the next terrorist attack? Most Americans
do not want to sacrifice individual freedom. Individual freedom is one of America’s
greatest assets and liabilities. Preventing the next terrorist attack require a compromise of
what we have treasured for over two centuries: individual liberty. Downing and Mayer
(2013) said that national security must take what it has learned from the Boston marathon
attacks and answer a vital question: how can the U.S. create an operative security net
involving state-run and local law enforcement organizations?
The U.S. would benefit more if organizations were developed to the extent of how
the FBI was introduced in1908: to create an additional level of expertise and
specialization toward lone wolves and to share critical information beyond certain
jurisdictions. Intelligence agencies lack information sharing because of federal and state
policies. This culture can no longer be tolerated and must quickly change to prevent the
next lone wolf attack.
Lone wolf attacks are often difficult to carry out, but that does not stop the state of
the threat (Coffey, 2011). Reports surfaced that the FBI had information on the Boston
suspects, but because of the advice on behalf of the United States Attorney’s Office, they
could not share it. If this was the case, a few things should happen: Congress should
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rewrite legislation allowing information to be either passed or shared, or reevaluate the
organization that is holding such information (FBI, 2013).
Ritchey (2013) talked about the power of partnerships, particularly, the FBI’s lead
role in the Boston bombing case. The lone wolf committed a crime before it became an
act or terror. If the FBI would have shared the intelligence with the local police
department the attack could have been prevented. The lack of information sharing
between federal and state law enforcement organizations hinder investigations and create
gaps within the intelligence. This is where such policy and legislation would benefit
national security and potentially save lives. Best practices should be revisited in terms of
the legal structure and formality.
Governmental entities are less likely to distribute any information that may prove
harmful when a series of practices arise in a case like the Boston bombing attacks.
Investigators are subject to restriction with information sharing and this policy has
allowed attacks to be underwritten at home. In contrast to the federal government, lone
wolf acts confront minor challenges since the cost of terrorist attacks are minimal.
Individual acts require less resources given that they do not operate under an established
terrorist hierarchy, field commanders, engage with others or propaganda dissemination,
operate openly or deliver goods (Perlmutter, 2013). Criminal cases shall be handled
locally rather than by the federal government.
It is a challenge, and it is intensely difficult in identifying the next lone wolf
terrorist. Sacrificing individual freedom will never totally eradicate the threat of
terrorism; this would only hamper individuals’ freedom, which makes this nation the

49
best. The U.S. can, however, make changes constitutionally that would enhance the
chances of detecting lone wolves and averting future lone wolf terrorist attacks.
Social Change Mechanism
Assessing the change process regarding the greater security concern requires an
understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, an assessment is needed to look at the
underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from
existing radical movements (TTRSL, 2008). This study addressed the gap by studying the
individual phenomenon as oppose to the group phenomenon.
As stated by Mendelson (2008), terrorism is an inter-reliant structure of elements
and individuals, and a more comprehensive understanding of the lone wolf terrorist
phenomenon can be assessed by viewing it in a multifaceted scheme. Scholars normally
view lone wolf terrorism as a group phenomenon to get general understanding; a single
examination starts with the identification of an individual (lone wolf); examining the
elements of that greater society, and then viewing the problem or phenomenon within that
greater society. The view from many scholars and securing officials is that a major
challenge and/or limitation of the leaderless lone wolf are that they are hard to detect.
As Stewart (2011) said, it is very challenging to separate between those radicals
who have every intention to commit terror acts from those who just voice their opinion.
To distinguish the probable lone wolf before they act, national security officials must use
unlimited resources and time searching for these individuals. This is a frightening
assignment, considering the vast number of potential suspects that are out there. A
consortium approach between all levels of government will help take on these challenges.
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Another change that can help effectively achieve this goal is that they require consistent
engagement from all businesses and communities.
Summary
Identifying the lone wolf terrorist, whose attacks are high profile, very dangerous,
and extremely challenging to detect, before they act poses a significant threat to national
security, and is the essential reason national security officials are concerned. Lone wolf
terrorists act alone from established hierarchies, forcing national security officials to try
to comprehend the “how and why” he or she transform to a terrorist. National security
officials must identify individual terrorist activities carried out by those individuals from
those carried out as a part of terrorist networks. In concern of the potential impact of lone
wolf terrorism on national security, characteristics regarding the lone wolf terrorist
formulate a knowledge base to identify potential suspects.
As indicated by FBI Director Robert Mueller (2003), lone wolf terrorists, those
who individually and independently commit solo acts of terror on their own behalf away
from established terrorist organizations, are the most difficult to seek out before they act
and hence pose a huge security concern. No statement was more significant than
Hoffman’s forewarning in 2013. Homeland terrorism in the United States today may be
more of a threat than global terrorism. The homeland terrorist threat in our country
constitutes the framework to explain the phenomenon as a new strategy to show the
diminishment of terrorist and insurgent movements internationally.
The leaderless resistance model forms the theoretical basis for setting aside the
mystique of the lone wolf and examining the reality of the phenomenon. Leaderless
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resistance theory introduced by Ulius Amoss in 1962 personifies concerns related to lone
wolves. As stated by Michael (2012), what caused individuals to unilaterally take violent
actions in the name of a political or social cause remains an area of concern. Lacking a
known, identified, or established leadership hierarchy, these troublesome individuals
challenge the imbalance of power that manifests itself as a lone wolf, surfacing as
terrorists or radical extremists, thereby creating difficulties to be stamped out. The
implication of leaderless resistance theory to lone wolf terrorism is that the problem
focuses on the phenomena aspects of the leaderless lone wolf terrorist and the underlying
mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing
radical movement, to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends.
For the lone wolf, building upon previous research for establishing a qualitative
phenomenological approach was appropriate to address the threat of lone wolves. Lone
attackers have demonstrated the threat they pose. They follow a pattern and are
susceptible to exposure at some point in the process. Identifying this process is essential
to addressing the problem posed by these individuals in a rational and practical way
(Bjelopera, 2012). The leaderless resistance strategy was used to help identify intangible
factors such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion,
whose role in the research may not be clear (Creswell, 2009).
Similarly, Phillips (2011) discussed how the individualistic nature of lone wolf
terrorism might, however, command more subtleness from several economic, theoretical
models that may lend themselves to its analysis. The reviewing of literature provided
insight into lone wolf terrorism and the changes that need to be made to address the
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greater security concern. Lieberman and Collins (2011) pointed out that the role of
national security is to involve others, such as the Attorney General, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and direct coordination from
the federal government to local levels of government. It is very important that the
agencies be on the same page and have the proper training during the investigative
process. Legal ethics training must be given to elude any violations of human rights and
decisions that otherwise may violate civil freedoms (Bryneilson et al., 2013). While
Lieberman and Collins’s plans suggested that role of national security should involve
others and additional training, Stewart (2011) stated it is very challenging to separate
between those radicals who have every intention to commit terrorist acts from those who
just voice their opinion of hate and/or radical beliefs. To distinguish the probable lone
wolf before they act, national security officials must use unlimited resources and time
searching for individuals who may be transitioning their extreme beliefs into actions.
Chapter 3 presents a qualitative research design as a method of study, consisting of
secondary data analysis from the RAND and GTD databases.

53
Chapter 3: Research Method
Lone wolf terrorism has been described as a convenient method for individuals to
plan and conduct terrorist attacks by way of avoidance and a lack of detection. This study
addressed factors beyond the general qualities of lone wolf terrorists. I examined whether
factors such as social norms, socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, and religion affect
the lone wolf phenomenon. This chapter includes the study design and how the data were
collected and analyzed.
When I conducted the study, I realized many advantages of qualitative research
and a phenomenological design. I could understand the phenomenon by exploring the
totality of data. In addition, qualitative research helped me uncover trends in the thought
process of lone wolves and immerse further into the problem. Notably, I was in control of
the study and it allowed me to explore the phenomenon in its natural setting. The
qualitative researcher does not need to control the environment as in quantitative studies,
which rely on numerical data (Qualitative Approaches, 2013). I sought answers to
questions that underline how the phenomenon was formed and given significance.
Research Question
The following research question was used to guide the study: What are the
underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from
an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent
ends? The sub questions were as follows: What causes an individual to participate in lone
wolf terrorism? Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a
potential lone wolf actor?
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Research Design and Rationale
To answer the central research question, I explored aspects of the leaderless lone
wolf terrorist and its mechanisms and processes. An inclusive study of lone wolf
terrorism was needed to promote U.S. national security. To identify the factors related to
the phenomenon, I chose a phenomenological design.
The rationale for using a phenomenological design is that it allowed me to focus
on the experience of the individual regarding the phenomenon (see McNabb, 2010). The
phenomenological design is ideal when the researcher seeks to gain a comprehensive
understanding of a difficult problem and to broaden the practices of prior research
(McNabb, 2010). The central question influenced selection of the research design.
According to Creswell (2009), phenomenological inquiries are conducted to
explain the phenomena according to the lived experiences of individuals. Qualitative
research focuses on achieving a thorough understanding of a phenomenon or a type of
experience (Creswell, 2009). Because there were limited studies involving lone wolf
terrorism, it was challenging to find data. Most studies conducted on terrorism involved a
group perspective, which limited the understanding of lone wolf terrorism. (Horne,
2012).
Qualitative Approaches
When deciding on a qualitative phenomenological approach, I considered four
other approaches: narrative, grounded theory, ethnographic, and case study. The narrative
approach focuses on the hierarchy of social data. Furthermore, the narrative approach
assumes that information is valuable and noteworthy even if it is known by only one
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individual (Creswell, 2007). However, 177 individuals and incidents were included in
this study.
Grounded theory involves a bottom-up approach. A theory is developed from the
process of collecting data and systemically coding it (Small, 2009). The intent of the
current study was not to develop a theory for leaderless lone wolf terrorism. According to
small (2009), ethnographic studies include trends and actions to get a better idea of the
relations involving social clusters. This approach was not appropriate in exploring lone
wolf terrorism because lone wolves might share common characteristics as a group, but
lone wolves are not a group phenomenon. Case studies are limited by intervals and
activities, which were not relevant to the current study (see University of South Alabama,
2013). This study was conducted to understand the challenges and threats lone wolves
pose to national security, and to explore individuals who share common characteristics
and goals. The University of South Alabama (2013) stated that the examiner’s intent is to
gain a pathway into the participant’s life experiences and the way the individual sees the
world. The phenomenological design was best for this study.
Phenomenological Design
A phenomenological design is an effective way for the researcher to translate the
personal experience of individuals into their personal perspective (Creswell, 2009). The
design enables the researcher to develop a real-world theory to advise, assist, or contest a
course of action (McNabb, 2010). Data on lone wolf terrorists were limited, and only
studies that dissociated the lone wolf from the group phenomenon could address their
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unique experiences. According to Creswell (2009), to gain a better understanding of the
phenomenon, the researcher must analyze the role played by the phenomenon.
Phenomenological research has developed into several methods and approaches to
studying the lived experience of others. Phenomenology is used to investigate the origin
and practice of something or someone (Sonoma University, 2013). Researchers often use
the term when describing an approach to qualitative inquiry. Merely, phenomenology is a
way of thinking that underlines a focus on individual experiences and how individuals
see the world (Qualitative Approaches, 2013).
Secondary Data Selection Process
Secondary data selection is defined as the process of determining the suitable
data, source, and the appropriate tools to collect data (Silverman, 2016). Prior to
importing documents into NVivo (software), I selected data that were only relevant to
lone wolf terrorism in the United States. The term differentiates data choice from data
reporting (not using data that has no relevance to your study) and collection (secondary
data analysis). The process allows researcher to choose the data that is the most viable to
the study (Silverman, 2016).
I selected the data documents and tools to sufficiently address questions. This
selection is specific and is driven by the nature of the research project, current data, and
the availability of data sources (see Marshall and Rossman, 2014). Ethical problems arise
when data is based upon convenience and cost rather than proficiency to address the
questions (Marshall and Rossman, 2014). Convenience and cost is important when and
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data selection precedes data collection. The process of selecting suitable data for the
study can comprise the data integrity of this study (Glaser & Laudel, 2013).
Secondary data collection was driven by the nature of the study, current literature,
and accessibility to essential data sources. The appropriate data came from many sources
and was lone wolf specific. Secondary data analysis was convenient and less costly
because the information had been researched during the qualitative research process. The
accumulation or pre-establishment of data helped because I would not have been able to
collect a rich amount of data.
In addition, I use secondary data create a suitable phenomenological design to
compare data analysis. Before I conducted the study, I made sure the data was aligned
with the research questions. This allowed me to review similar sources of data and the
data collection method. Secondary data was excellent to use not so much for the analysis
of the pre-established information, but as a pre-designed study. The substantial amount of
information available displayed pre-established levels of validity and reliability.
Data Collection
Current literature on lone wolf terrorism is sparse, but can be presented in
numerous of ways. Few studies that have been conducted on lone wolf terrorism and it is
difficult to extricate the data type and source that is few and far between. The goal of data
collection was to select data that was representative of lone wolves domestically.
National security officials can devise a plan and or form solutions from the suitable data.
Failure to share information may underwrite further lone wolf attacks.
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Secondary data collection in this study was retrieved from the RAND and GTD
databases to research lone wolf terrorism. Both are electronic filed databases and
compose of inclusive files regarding terrorist acts or efforts. Secondary data such as
interviews, field notes, surveys, and other sourced material regarding lone wolf terrorism
was examined. Data was assembled and filed from acts and efforts that had previously
occurred. The databases were organized accordingly by date (after 9/11/01) and location
(U.S.) and by the characterization of lone wolf terrorism outlined for the reasons of this
study.
When I carried out secondary data analysis, I examined the relationship between
primary data and secondary data. I wanted to make sure the study questions from the
analysis were identical to those of the previous study, and the primary data collection
analytic techniques was applied to the secondary analysis (Northern Arizona University,
2013).
Data Analysis Methods
Once all the suitable data was gathered, individual source data (audio files,
transcripts, etc.) were produced for each of the individuals. I coded and divided the data
into themes and it allowed me to categorize qualitative data and explore the scheme and
specifics of the categories. The process begins with open coding, allowing for small
amounts of data to be entered while developing other preliminary categories. The coding
became more selective in terms of concepts and codes that were entered (Qualitative
Approaches, 2013). NVivo qualitative analysis software was used to analyze source
documents, whereas the analysis was more profound. Instead of manually analyzing the
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data, NVivo analyze the source documents, which allows the researcher to build theories
to answer and support the research questions (UCONN, 2013). Although, programs like
NVivo are used to analyze source data, the data was also manually coded and recorded in
the study for comfortability.
When analyzing the source data, there were several steps. First, I was able to
analyze and make sense of the data type and source. Second, I analyzed the data by going
over it repeatedly (most of the qualitative researchers call this process “peeling the skin
off the potatoes” in lieu of the data, and making an analysis (Creswell, 2009). Any cues
from transcripts and/or interviews were used to verify and validate source data. The
process was a guide and it limited potential biases to draw conclusions from the vast
amount of data in the electronic databases.
Qualitative research studies should be judged on the qualitative paradigm.
Qualitative research is recognized and respected in its unique approach to terrorism
(Qualitative Approaches, 2013). However, many critics believe that findings are often
biases, which threatens the credibility of qualitative research. Also, critics believe this
could be minimized if the researcher excludes personal opinions and beliefs. When
analyzing the data, I compared NVivo and Microsoft workbook.
Ethical Issues in the Use of Secondary Data Analysis Research
Secondary data has disadvantages. When conducting secondary data analysis,
consent from individuals should be obtained (Sringernyuang, n.d., p.1). Walden’s
University approval and consent was required before I went forward with the data
collection. Many times, the data originally collected for the study, may not be in the
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original format and/or may be difficult to obtain the right of entry in a public domain
database. Sringernyuang (n.d.) stated that, when gathering information from a public
domain like RAND’s database, anyone could partake in secondary data analysis. There is
a lack of guiding principles and actions reflecting ways to approach electronic collection
data, which is susceptible to being plagiarized, changed, and removed; as well, the
researcher’s data being misused, which unethical (Sringernyuang, n.d.). This study had
no research participants. The main benefit of the study was that it was pre-designed, did
not cost much, and was convenient.
Those who may have questions or concerns may refer to Walden University’s
research policies and guidelines. All of Walden University’s research policies and
guidelines were adhered to because there was no plagiarizing or removing source data, or
interpreting the results based on the need of my study. Findings from the research study
cannot be generalized outside of U.S. territory. The public domain databases are opensource and everyone has access on condition that the rules are followed.
Summary
A qualitative phenomenological design was used for this research study. The
elements in this study comprised of secondary data collection; gathering data through
secondary analysis; displaying pre-established levels of validity and reliability of the data
collection and analysis method. In Chapter 4, I discussed the results of the study
including the different typologies, dataset and database collection method, demographics,
defining secondary data analysis, the data analysis process for themes and codes, the data
analysis for excel workbook, and the summary.
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Chapter 4: Results
This study addressed the paradox between the considerable media attention lone
wolf terrorism has received and the lack of examination attributed to the phenomenon.
The purpose of the study was to explore the mechanisms and processes that lead
individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act
unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends.
Central Research Question and Sub questions
What are the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be
drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without
direction toward violent ends?
SQ1: What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism?
SQ2: Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a
potential lone wolf actor?
The RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge database and the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) allowed me to gather and analyze data to describe the experiences of the
lone wolf terrorist. Both RAND and the GTD have maintained databases on terrorism
events dating back to the late 1960s and contain comprehensive information on domestic
terrorism. Chapter 4 includes a description of the typologies of lone wolf terrorism,
databases used, and data collection. I also present the demographics, data analysis
process, results, evidence of trustworthiness, and a summary.
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Typologies
Numerous typologies illustrate lone wolf terrorism, yet research suggests no
illustration can characterize the lone wolf terrorist. Lone wolf contact is at a minimum, if
there is any contact at all, with other terrorists or terrorist organizations. These typologies
provide contrasting perceptions of the lone wolf phenomenon (Bates, 2012):
1. Extent of radicalization: A common trait of lone wolf terrorists is that they all
self-radicalize, but the extent to which it is personal or social through outside
influences is unknown.
2. Inspiration: Those who are egoistic or self-centered and think they may be
beyond the community and/or an ideological group.
3. Form: The form of lone wolf terrorism may be a lone event or a continuous
event.
4. Risk activity: The degree of risk the lone wolf is willing to take.
Pantucci (2011) also proposed a typology that identifies four types of lone wolf terrorists:
1. Loners: Individuals who use Islamist ideology to provide cover for their
attempted or carried out actions. Although they assert some devotion to
extremist Islamic beliefs, they appear to have no contact at all with terrorist
organizations besides the passive information on the Internet.
2. Lone wolves: Individuals, who carry out actions on their own, but
demonstrate little contact with terrorist operational extremists.
3. Lone wolf packs: Individual cells of loners who self-radicalized.
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4. Lone attackers: Individuals who operate on their own accord but show a direct
link to terrorist organizations.
Databases and Data Collection Method
Secondary data collection was used in this study. Data collected for the study are
available for public use. No data were collected until the final IRB approval was given on
June 13, 2017 (IRB approval number 06-13-17-0307965). Data were collected and
imported into NVivo from June 21, 2017 through July 23, 2017. No ethical issues arose
because there was no plagiarizing or removal of source data. The data records were
created to align with this study. Data were collected by exploring RAND and GTD
databases for lone wolf terrorist incidents post 9/11 until December of 2016. The search
involved lone wolf terrorist incidents in the United States and excluded any group
terrorism acts.
An act committed by an individual was marked other to identify a single person
as opposed to a group in RAND’s database. The GTD used the label individual to
designate a single perpetrator. RAND’s definition and criteria for incidents to be
considered terrorism included the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrators or
the nature of the cause; key elements included the following:
•

violence or the threat of violence,

•

calculated to create fear or alarm,

•

intended to coerce certain actions,

•

motive must include a political objective,

•

generally directed at civilian targets, and
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•

can be a group or individual (RAND, 2013 p. 1).

For incidents to be included in the GTD, several parameters had to be met:
The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force
and violence by a non- state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or
social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice, this means to
consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes
must be present: The incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious
calculation on the part of a perpetrator. The incident must entail some level of
violence or immediate threat of violence—including property violence, as well as
violence against people. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national
actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism. In addition, at least
two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included
in the GTD: The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic,
religious, or social goal; The violent act included evidence of an intention to
coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or
audiences) other than the immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the
precepts of International Humanitarian Law. (START, 2016, p.1)
The following terms were searched in the databases to garner specific results: homegrown
jihadist, lone wolf terrorism, domestic terrorism, loner, lone wolf, homegrown terrorist,
lone wolf packs, and individual.
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Codes
Each record was analyzed in NVivo using text such as perpetrator, nationality of
the victim, extremism, loner or lone wolves, the city and state, date, target, property, the
mechanisms and ideology derived from the literature, and the indicators that describe the
characteristics of the lone wolf terrorist. When I imported and analyzed these documents,
these words frequently appeared more than others. For example, the word assailant
appeared more often whereas arson appeared less often, as indicated by the font size in
the word cloud. Figure 1 illustrates the text search in NVivo.

Figure 1. NVivo text search.
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Demographics
There was a total of 341 terrorist incidents in the RAND and GTD databases from
9/12/01 to 12/31/2016. However, only 177 incidents met the criteria for the study and
multiple perpetrators committed multiple acts (see Figure 2). Other incidents were not
included because the perpetrator was unknown and the databases recorded incidents until
December of 2016. All incidents happened domestically. The perpetrators consisted of 10
females or 6%, 131 males or 74%, and the gender of 31or 18% of perpetrators was
unknown (see Figure 3). Out of the 177 incidents, 172 of those targets were of U.S.
nationality, 1 was Chinese, and 1 Israeli, 1 Mexican, 1 Ireland, and 1 incident had
multiple nationalities of people (see Figure 4). The perpetrators were involved in the acts
(confessed or physically represented) and incidents were classified as domestic lone wolf
terrorists.

Figure 2. Total incidents (341) from 9/12/2001-12312016.
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Figure 3. Basic demographics of the perpetrators.

Figure 4. Nationality of targets.

Pantucci’s (2011) typology characterized the different types of lone wolves in the
study. The individuals were aligned regarding the acts committed and the proper
descriptions of the individualized lone wolf. The lone wolves demonstrated some form of
contact with operational extremists, yet, their acts were carried out alone and they
appeared to be more disturbed individuals seeking consolation in extremist beliefs. The
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loners did not appear to have any contact with operational extremists, and their acts
seemed reactive at large to the passive information on the internet.
Data Collection
I reviewed chapters 1 through 3 focusing more on the research design. After
assessing the research design, I used the preceding terms to search the databases resulting
in74 total source documents, including testimonies, research reports, reviewed articles,
and specific attacks. It took one month to collect the sources data and import it into
NVivo. I began developing codes and themes to assist me with categorizing the data.
Conducting research prior to data being imported into NVivo helped familiarize my
conception of the sources as well as manage my time more efficiently.
Defining Secondary Data Analysis
Secondary data is the analysis of data that was collected by someone else
(Boslaugh, 2007). Secondary data is used to explore alternative research questions from
the original data that were collected. The process of coding and classifying themes
involved steps, which were formed around my research questions. NVivo software was
the primary tool used for coding and manual coding was secondary. This course of action
helped examine and evaluate the analysis process, although it prolonged time.
Steps of Secondary Data Analysis
Portable Document Format (PDF) data were imported from the RAND and GTD
databases. Likewise, I duplicated the digital word scripts and imported them into NVivo.
When documents were not in PDF, NVivo would not import the document unless they
were transcribed in a Word document. After all the sources were imported, I manually
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coded the themes in the interim. I checked off the sources manually to avoid reproducing
existing sources. I evaluated several codes and themes that emerged from the central and
sub questions using PDF and digital word scripts documents.
Data Analysis Process for Themes and Codes
The data analysis process was used to support the research questions. This
allowed me to gather the appropriate data which permitted me to answer the research
questions adequately. After the theme and supporting data was coded I checked it off
manually and I then returned to NVivo for more data coding applying the answers
accordingly to the themes and foregoing categories. The answers were confirmed to
obtain a representative sample.
I then used coded groupings to further materialize the themes. I began with the
prior themes that corresponded to each of the research questions: (a) individual
mechanisms contribute to likely lone wolf terrorists and their process to a violent end; (b)
the phenomenon of the domestic lone wolf terrorist is not limited to a movement. Rather,
lone terrorists operate on the fringes of extremist movements, with such loose
associations being connected to right-wing ideologies, inspired and fascinated by Islamist
ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and The Islamic State of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant
(ISIL), and self-developed ideologies facilitating violence based on political, religious, or
social change; (c) and these indicators characterized the potential lone wolf terrorist. I
replicated the steps for all the themes that emerged for each research question. The
mechanisms theme stemmed from the coding answers in the central research question.
The theme that lone wolf terrorists operate on the fringes of extremist movements was
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determined based on the coding answers from sub question 1. The indicators that
characterized lone wolves were developed from coding answers to sub question 2.
Data Analysis Process for Excel Workbook
I applied the same method of coding and analyzing data using the Excel
workbook. The process was not detailed due to workbook features. Individually, each
category was coded in no order:
•

perpetrator;

•

nationality of target;

•

extremism;

•

loner or lone wolves;

•

city-state;

•

date;

•

Ideologies- Rightwing (RW), Islamist (Al Qaida), and self-developed (SD);

•

Mechanisms-Personal and political grievance (PPG), Risk and status seeking
(RS) and Unfreezing (Unfreezing);

•

Indicators- Internet (SM), Fixation (F), Radical expressions (RE);

•

Identification (I), and Pseudo spontaneous communication (PSC);

•

Target- (People or Property) and;

•

Property damage- (Yes or No)

Once the Excel workbook was coded, I compared the data to ensure it was aligned
correctly and that it matched information that was imported into NVivo.
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Results
I began by discussing the themes that corresponds the research questions: (a)
individual mechanisms contribute to likely lone wolf terrorists and their process to a
violent end; (b) the phenomenon of the domestic lone wolf terrorist is not limited to a
movement. Rather, lone terrorists operate on the fringes of extremist movements; (c) and
these indicators characterized the potential lone wolf terrorist. I will then provide
examples associating with the theme that is being discussed. This will provide a further
outline in for chapter 5 regarding the interpretation of findings, recommendation, and
implication of the study.
Central Research Question
What are the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be
drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act unilaterally and without
direction toward violent ends? There are three individual underlying mechanisms and
processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical
movement: personal and political grievance, risk-and-status seeking, and unfreezing.
Primary experienced mechanism. Personal and political grievance is a
combination between the two and is the primary experienced mechanism of individual
radicalization. Individuals believe some sort of injustice has occurred either to them or to
society and they tend to form their own beliefs and ideologies. This materialized in 168
out of 177 incidents or 95% and was inferred from three experiences (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Mechanisms of individual radicalization.
Overall, the primary mechanisms that lead individuals to a violent end are one of
the most significant developments of the study. Personal and political grievance appeared
in numerous forms and was shown in ways such as individuals believing harm was
inflicted upon them individually or to society, assuming the environment or humanity
was being destroyed, and feeling like policies, laws, and/or regulations were unjust. Here
are different examples of personal and or political grievance being demonstrated through
violent acts:
An assailant sent a message via Twitter to Kurt Eichenwald, a Newsweek
journalist, in Dallas, Texas, United States. The message contained the text “you
deserve a seizure for your posts” and a GIF image of a strobe. Edgar M. Welch
stated that he targeted Comet Ping Pong because he suspected the human
trafficking of children was occurring at the restaurant. Lakeem Keon Scott
claimed responsibility for the incident and stated that he carried out the attack
because he was upset with the deaths of African Americans by authorities in
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Louisiana and Minnesota. Sanford stated that he targeted Trump because he
believed “somebody had to stand up for America”. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
Others believed harm was inflicted upon them individually or to society:
Authorities arrested Dana Ericson, who confessed to the attack, self-identified as
a white supremacist, and indicated that his goal was ethnic cleansing. In court,
Ericson stated that he was trying to start a revolution. Robert Lewis Dear claimed
responsibility for the incident and stated that he was a “warrior for the babies.
Rasheed Abdul Aziz told the pastor that he had been sent by “Allah” to slay
infidels. Hapner confessed to the arson and claimed that he was trying to
“eradicate pornography.” (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
For instance, when individuals assumed the environment or humanity was been
destroyed, random bombings took place as an example:
At approximately 3:15 a.m. local time, seven firebombs were detonated at a
newly constructed apartment complex in Sutter Creek, California, United States.
Six of the firebombs were extinguished by the sprinkler system, but the seventh
firebomb exploded and caused approximately $50,000 worth of damage to the
complex, although no casualties resulted from this attack. The group Earth
Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility for this attack and subsequently
three individuals were arrested and charged. Similarly, an assailant attempted to
bomb a natural gas pipeline in Plano, Texas, United States and was critically
injured. Sources note that Anson Chi identified as part of the anti-government
Sovereign Citizen movement. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
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Some of the individuals felt like policies, laws, and/or regulations were unjust. Case in
point:
A letter containing ricin was mailed to the Director of Mayors against Illegal
Guns, Mark Glaze, in Washington, District of Columbia, United States. The letter
warned of future attacks if Glaze and other gun control advocates pursued
legislation to limit gun ownership. Joseph Stack flew his private plane into the
IRS building. He had problems with the IRS in the past and believed violence was
the only answer. Dwight Watson, a tobacco farmer from North Carolina, drove a
tractor through the Constitution Gardens in Washington D.C., United States.
Watson believed that the tobacco policies of the United States government were
unfair to the tobacco farmer and he was trying to bring nationwide attention to the
policies that he maintained ruined him financially. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
Second experience mechanism. Risk-and-status seeking individuals were
devoted and inspired and/or fascinated by the teachings of Anwar Awlaki’s, Abu
Muhammad al Adnani, and/or Osama bin Laden under al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
or The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) for whom violence may seem the best path
for respect. This materialized in 8 out of 177 incidents or 5% and was the second most
experienced mechanism in the study (see Figure 5).
The risk-and-status seeking individual mechanism of radicalization was
demonstrated in numerous of cases. For instance:
Security forces discovered and defused an explosive device in the Chelsea
neighborhood of Manhattan, New York City, United States. The device was
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discovered several blocks away from an explosion that occurred earlier the same
day. Ahmad Khan Rahami claimed responsibility for this incident and three
similar bombings that occurred between September 17 and September 18, 2016 in
New York and New Jersey. Sources suspected that Rahami may have been
inspired by Abu Muhammad al Adnani, a spokesperson for the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Sources also noted that Rahami admired Osama bin
Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki in his journal. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
An assailant shot and killed John Bailey Clark Jr. and buried him in a grave outside his
residence in Morganton, North Carolina, United States:
No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, sources attributed the
attack to an individual, identified as Justin Nojan Sullivan. Sources posited that
Sullivan, who was arrested in connection to the attack, targeted John Bailey Clark
Jr. to steal money from the victim, so he could purchase a rifle to carry out an
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) inspired attack. (GTD and RAND,
2017, p.1)
Shots were fired at the Pentagon located in Arlington, Virginia, United States:
Security reported hearing between five and seven shots fired at the building at
4:55 am. No one was injured in the attack, but two windows were damaged.
Yonathan Melaku, a Marine Corps reservist, was arrested on June 17, 2011, for an
unrelated incident but was charged on June 21, 2011, for the Pentagon shooting
and several other similar attacks in the area, including two shootings on the
National Museum of the Marine Corps, and two at Marine Corps and Coast Guard
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recruiting stations. Sources report that Melaku was fascinated by al-Qaeda, but
did not claim to be a member of the organization. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
Third experience mechanism. Unfreezing is a personal crisis such as a mental
disorder or illness that leaves an individual with less to lose and in search of new
directions. This happened once out of the 177 incidents or 1% and was the least
experienced mechanism (see Figure 5). One eccentric perpetrator left a note containing:
A small pipe bomb put in a foam box was found in a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
United States mailbox. Police safely detonated the device, which was packed with
nails, and no one was hurt. The bomb had a note that stated, “Free Palestine” and
also reportedly made some reference to al-Qaeda. A 53-year-old Philadelphia
man, Preston Lit, who had no connections with al-Qaeda or any other terrorist
group, was charged with threatening to use explosives. He had a criminal past and
reportedly suffered from bi-polar disorder and other mental sicknesses. (GTD and
RAND, 2017, p.1)
Sources noted the existence of mental illness should not be an indicator of limited
rationality or reduced ability to plan and conduct an attack. The correlation of mental
illness with lone wolf terrorists should not, therefore, be considered an indicator that a
lone wolf terrorist presents a reduced threat; rather the findings are a further contribution
toward understanding the phenomenon (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1).
Sub question 1
What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism? There is no single
profile of a lone wolf terrorist. As was stated earlier, usually it is combination between
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personal and political grievances. It is extremely difficult to differentiate between
individuals using terrorism because of personal and political grievances and those that are
committed to an ideology. Sub question 1: includes right-wing ideologies (a); selfdeveloped ideologies (b); and Islamist ideologies (c).
Primary experienced ideologies. The primary experienced ideology that
developed from this study was right-wing ideology. Right-wing ideology refers to a
person or group who holds extreme or fanatical political or religious views, especially
one who resorts to or advocates extreme actions without organizational assistance. This
occurred in 78 out 177 incidents, or 44% and was inferred from 13 right-wing extremist
ideological movements (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Right-wing ideology extremists.

Largely for sub research question 1 and the second significant theme, domestic
lone wolf terrorists are not limited to a movement; rather, lone terrorists operate on the
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fringes of extremist movements. This was the most profound, volatile, and rebellious
form of terrorism associated with a lone wolf in this study. But, only four will be
discussed because they had eight or more incidents: anti-government extremists; antiMuslim extremists; white extremists; and anti-abortion extremists.
Anti-government right-wing extremist sees the government as the enemy and use
violence as a result.
For example:
An assailant opened fire on a federal courthouse in Austin, Texas, United States.
This was one of three attacks carried out by the assailant that targeted government
and security buildings in the city. Sources suspected that anti-government and
anti-immigration sentiments fueled the incidents. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
The anti-Muslim extremist movement is a new phenomenon. Many of these attacks begin
post 9/11 and extreme aggression is shown toward Muslims individuals. The perpetrators
who oppose Muslims see Islam as the fundamental reason for their inherent behavior.
For instance:
An assailant assaulted a Muslim store clerk at Fatima Food Mart in Queens, New
York City, United States. The clerk was injured in the attack. The assailant,
identified as Piro Kolvani, said, “I kill Muslims” during the attack and was later
arrested.” (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
White supremacists believe they are superior to all other races and some perpetrators
demonstrated their experience in the following ways:
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On Wednesday afternoon at approximately 12:40, in Washington, District of
Columbia., United States, an assailant armed with a rifle entered the National
Holocaust Memorial Museum and fired upon civilians, killing one security guard,
Stephen Tyrone, and injuring an unknown number of civilians. The shooter was
wounded critically in the attack and identified as white supremacist, James W.
von Brunn. Officials believe the attack may have been politically motivated.
(GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
The anti-abortion movements are individuals or groups who believe abortion is unethical
and that violence is justified against people and establishments providing abortion
services. These begin as counter-movements and then they developed into acts such as
the following:
An assailant opened fire on a Planned Parenthood clinic and held an unknown
number of people hostage for five hours in Colorado Springs, Colorado, United
States. At least three people were killed and nine other people were wounded in
the assault. An individual, identified as Robert Lewis Dear, claimed responsibility
for the incident and stated that he was a “warrior for the babies.” (GTD and
RAND, 2017, p.1)
Second experienced ideologies (single-issue protest). Self-developed ideology (singleissue protest) is when the individual takes steps in advocating or adopting an extremist
belief to facilitate ideologically-based violence to advance political, religious, or social
change. This second experienced ideology materialized from sub question 1 and
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materialized in 67 out 177 incidents or 38% (see Figure 7), and was led by unknown
extremist and the Earth Liberation Front.

Figure 7. Self-developed ideology extremists.

When trying to illustrate the lone wolf terrorist, it is difficult because often pieces they do
not come with warning signs. Their extremism, if any exists, appears to be unknown. For
example:
An assailant set fire to a residence in Endicott, New York, United States. The
offender placed gasoline-filled cans throughout the house as obstacles and spraypainted the anti-police message “lie with pigs, fry like bacon” on an exterior wall
of the house before starting the blaze. The family sleeping inside the house
escaped, and no injuries were reported. No group claimed responsibility;
however, authorities arrested and charged firefighter Jason T. Stokes with starting
the fire at his own house.” (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
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The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) uses “economic” sabotage and guerilla warfare to stop
the exploitation and destruction of the environment. In 2001, the ELF was classified as
the top domestic terror threat to the United States by the Federal Bureau of
Investigations. These autonomous individuals continue to conduct attacks every so often.
For instance:
Grant Barnes, suspected affiliated with the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), planted
an incendiary device under a parked 1996 Chevrolet Tahoe in the driveway of
Josh and Jennifer Rudolph’s home in the Cherry Creek neighborhood of Denver,
Colorado in the United States. The SUV sustained heavy fire damage, but there
were no casualties in the incident. Two more devices were discovered, targeting
other SUVs in the area on this day. These were three in a series of seven
firebombs which Barnes planted in the Cherry Creek area, targeting SUVs over
the course of four days. Barnes was arrested on March 22, 2007, indicted, and
pled guilty in July 2007, and sentenced to 12 years in prison. (GTD and RAND,
2017, p.1)
Third experienced ideologies. Individuals used Islamist ideologies that were
inspirational, fascinating, and devoted to the teachings of Abu Muhammad al Adnani,
Anwar Awlaki’s, in Osama bin Laden in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and The Islamic
State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) to commit violent acts. The third experienced ideology
materialized as well from sub question 1(see Figure 8), and had 32 occurrences out 177
incidents, or 18%. The two extremisms that materialized the most from Islamist ideology
were Jihadi-inspired extremists and Muslim extremists.
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Figure 8. Islamist ideology extremists.

Jihadi-inspired extremists refer to Islamic extremism occurring within the United
States. Islamic extremism is adherence to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam,
potentially using violence to achieve political goals. Ali Muhammad Brown was one of
the:
assailants that shot and killed Brendan Tevlin as he was stopped at a traffic signal
in West Orange, New Jersey, United States. Police later arrested three suspects,
including Ali Muhammad Brown, in connection with the case. Authorities claim
that Brown committed the act to punish the United States for its involvement in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Brown has been indicted on murder charges in connection
with two separate attacks that occurred earlier in the year in Skywalk and Seattle,
which are both located in the state of Washington. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
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Muslim extremists perceive any form of Islam that opposes “democracy,” the rule of law,
individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. This
was identified when:
An assailant opened fire on a military recruiting office in Chattanooga,
Tennessee, United States. There were no reported casualties resulting from the assault.
This was one of two attacks carried out by the same assailant within a short period of
time; after targeting the office, the assailant attacked a military training center in the area.
No group claimed responsibility for the incidents; however, the assailant was later
identified as Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
Sub question 2
Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a potential
lone wolf actor? In characterizing the lone wolf terrorist, there are several indicators:
gender, the internet, radical expressions, pseudo spontaneous communication, fixation,
and identification. However, only pseudo spontaneous communication, fixation,
identification, and radical expressions were discussed because they had eight or more
incidents.
Primary experienced indicator. Pseudo spontaneous communication involves
the intentional and strategic manipulation of some formal display(s). Individuals will
attack a mosque or another symbolic display to express their personal and or political
grievance towards an object or person, sending a message to infuriate others. Pseudo
spontaneous communication materialized in 71 out of 177 incidents or 40%. This
emerged from sub question 2 (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Indicators characterizing the lone wolf.

Overall, pseudo spontaneous communication was shown to be a consistent
indicator of the lone wolf. The incidents are an important way for individuals to get their
message across and contain important information from the “individual” perspective.
This theme is defined by the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrator or the
nature of the cause, and was reflected in the following incidents below:
An assailant set fire to the Islamic Center mosque in Fort Pierce, Florida, United
States. There were no reported casualties in the attack. Joseph Michael Schreiber
was arrested and claimed responsibility for the incident. An explosive device
detonated in a Rainbow Times newspaper box in Salem, Massachusetts, United
States. There were no reported casualties in the blast. No group claimed
responsibility for the incident. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
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Second experienced indicator. Fixation is being obsessed with a person or cause
and it was subsequent to pseudo spontaneous communication with 57 out 177 incidents,
or 32% (see Figure 9). These incidents tend to play out in numerous ways and they seem
to be focused on societal issues like the two-described underneath:
An unknown anti-police extremist group claimed responsibility for the incident in
a note left at the scene and stated, “Black Lives Matter” while also mentioning
Alton Sterling and Philando Castile.” An assailant also opened fire on New York
City Police Department officers while they were sitting in their vehicle in
Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood, Brooklyn, New York City, United States.
Officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos were killed in the attack. The assailant,
identified as Ismaaiyl Brinsley, claimed responsibility and stated that the attack
was carried out to avenge the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner at the
hands of the authorities.
Third experienced indicator. Identification is the willingness of the attacker to
commit violence as an agent of a belief system. This occurred in 27 out 177 incidents, or
15% (see Figure 9). Because identification is an indicator that leads individuals to violent
ends, this suggests the individual’s behavior is driven by components of social identity
like in such cases below:
Three assailants armed with knives attacked a group of Hispanic teenagers
playing soccer at Stephen Sorensen Park in Lake Los Angeles, California, United
States. At least two people suffered minor injuries in the assault. The three
assailants, identified as Ian Justine Plankey, Richard Lawrence Daulton, and
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Kevin Matthew Stewart, were arrested following the incident. During the attack,
they shouted white supremacist statements and racial slurs, including “Heil Hitler,
AV Skins.” Furthermore, an assailant attacked a police patrol with a hatchet in
Queens, New York City, United States. The assailant was killed and two officers
and a bystander were wounded in the attack. Zale Thompson, a convert to Islam,
was responsible for the incident. (GTD and RAND, 2017, p.1)
Fourth experienced indicator. Individuals frequently use radical expressions in
social media, blog postings, and alternate forums to express their personal and or political
beliefs. This materialized under sub question 2, showing 16 out of 177 incidents, or 9%
(see Figure 9). For example:
Sources identified the assailant as Gavin Long and while his specific motive is
unknown, Long’s social media presence indicated that the attack may have been
related to racial tensions. On social media, the assailants expressed radical views
and decried the federal government, taxes, anti-gun laws, and demanded a
revolution. In another attack, both assailants identified as Syed Rizwan Farook
and Tashfeen Malik, fled the scene but were located and killed in a shootout with
police the later the same day. Tashfeen malik pledged allegiance to the leader of
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on social media on the day of the
attack. ISIL referenced the assailants as ‘soldiers of the caliphate.’ However,
sources did not report a connection between the assailants and ISIL.
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Evidence of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness consisted of several components in this study: (a) Credibility:
ethical issues and principles were adhered to because all source document data remained
the primary source; (b) Transferability: is trustworthy because data were imported
directly into NVivo precisely; (c) Dependability: the dependability of the study
materialized from 74 sources, which, in turn, produced 177 perpetrators from testimonies,
research reports, and reviewed articles; (d) and Intra Coder-Reliability: an intra-coder
technique was a more effective way to convey and transform the personal experience of
individuals from their personal perspective, challenging fundamental beliefs (Creswell,
2009).
Credibility
As for the credibility of my phenomenological research study, all potential ethical
issues and principles were adhered to because all the source document data remained the
primary source, and there was no plagiarizing, copying, or removing of the data. I used
the research data to examine a correlation primary and secondary data to carrying out the
research. The purpose was to ensure the studies questions were aligned with my research
questions, and that the primary data collection and analytic techniques were applied to the
secondary analysis (Northern Arizona University, 2013). Secondary data helped create
my research design and it provided an outline to which secondary data analysis was
compared.
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Transferability
Transferability is conveyable because data were imported directly into NVivo
precisely. The data gathered from the source documents were coded and schematized.
Because of the substantial amount of information available, secondary data analysis
displayed pre-established levels of validity and reliability, which do not have to be
examined again by the researcher if he or she has plans to re-use the information
(Sringernyuang, n.d.).
Dependability
The dependability of the study materialized from 74 sources, which, in turn,
produced 177 perpetrators from testimonies, research reports, and review articles that met
stringent criteria for it to be categorized as lone wolf terrorism in this study. This study
had no research participants. The main benefit of the study could assist national security
officials and intelligence agencies in identifying lone wolf individuals, weighing the
actual threat versus the perception, developing better counterterrorism strategies for the
lone wolf phenomenon. Programs like NVivo are commonly used and make data more
manageable to analyze, record, and edit. The data was manually coded in addition so that
I was comfortable engaging with the data.
Intra-Coder Reliability
An intra-coder technique was a more effective way to convey and transform the
personal experience of individuals into their personal perspective, challenging
fundamental beliefs (Creswell, 2009). Most importantly, this dimension to the research
study enabled me to use it as a foundation for a real-world theory, allowing it to advise,
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assist, or contest course of action (McNabb, 2010). Although data were limited and
researchers and scholars talk about their perception of the lone wolf terrorist through
group terrorism studies, studies that disassociate the lone wolf from the group
phenomenon can define their exact experiences, obstacles, and benefits.
Summary
The objective of chapter 4 was to provide analysis and exploration of qualitative
data with 177 incidents of lone wolf incidents in the United States post 9/11. The results
were discussed in detail through the lenses of the perpetrators for which the lone wolf
actions are set in motion, ultimately leading to a violent end. A qualitative
phenomenological design was used via secondary analytical method.
The findings support that there are three individual-level underlying mechanisms
and processes (personal and political grievance, risk and status seeking, unfreezing) that
lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act
unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends. The phenomenon of the domestic
lone wolf terrorist is not limited to a movement. Rather, lone terrorists operate on the
fringes of extremist movements, with such loose associations being connected to rightwing ideologies, inspired and fascinated by Islamist ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and
The Islamic State of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant (ISIL), and self-developed ideologies
facilitating violence based on political, religious, or social change. There were several
indicators to characterize the lone wolf terrorist: gender, the internet, fixation,
identification, and pseudo spontaneous communication. In chapter 5 I advance the
discussion, conclusion, and give recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to explore the lone wolf phenomenon apart from
other types of political violence and terrorism using the RAND-MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Database. Data were collected for this study
through the gathering of testimonies, research reports, reviewed articles, and specified
attacks. This study was guided by the central research question: What are the underlying
mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing
radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends?
Additionally, two sub questions were explored: What causes an individual to participate
in lone wolf terrorism? Are there consistent and significant indicators that can
characterize a potential lone wolf actor?
The three main themes addressed the three research questions in the study. First,
results indicated that personal and political grievance, risk and status seeking, and
unfreezing were the major mechanisms and processes of lone wolf terrorism. Second,
right-wing ideology extremist movements, Islamist ideology extremist movements, and
self-developed ideology extremist movements were the primary causes of domestic
terrorism. Third, men were more likely to be involved in lone wolf incidents using formal
displays, fixation, and venting radical expressions.
The central research question was answered via the results from the primary
question and the sub questions. Regarding how mechanisms and processes have
influenced the domestic terrorist, a central finding indicated that there was no single
profile to characterize the domestic lone wolf. Instead, personal and group grievance, as

91
well as a self-developed ideology, allows the domestic terrorist to lie dormant and
undetected. However, although grievances are a part of the process, gender is a major
indicator. The findings indicated that domestic lone wolf terrorist acts are not always
large, yet they cause considerable damage to the government and the populace.
Interpretation of Findings
I conducted a phenomenological study to explore, identify, and describe the
experiences of lone wolf terrorists through 177 domestic lone wolf terrorist incidents.
The study addressed the paradox between the considerable media attention lone wolf
terrorism has received and the lack of formal study of the phenomenon. The study was
designed to answer one central research question and two sub questions. This section
provides an interpretation of the findings for the central research question, Sub question
1, and Sub question 2.
Central Research Question
This study was guided by the central research question: What are the underlying
mechanisms and processes that lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing
radical movement and to act unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends? The
findings suggested that the underlying mechanisms and processes of the domestic lone
wolf terrorist acting alone are not the same as thinking autonomously. The individual’s
mental process must be oppressed or he or she must be grieving personally or politically.
Lone wolf terrorists are risk- and status-seeking individuals who are inspired and/or
fascinated by different ideologies for which violence may seem the best path to gain
respect. Mental illness may or may not play a role in the act, and the disconnection leaves
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an individual with less to lose and in search of new directions. This allows the domestic
terrorist to lie dormant and undetected. However, gender does play a major role.
Personal and political grievances can transfix the lone wolf terrorist’s thought
process. For instance, the thought process of an anti-Muslim extremist believing that
Islam is the inherent cause for their acts and a Muslim extremist believing that the wars
are an attack on Islam weighs heavily upon them. Anti-Muslim extremist perspectives on
Islam and Muslim extremist perspectives on the wars were created individually, but they
did not manifest autonomously. When individuals act alone and are motivated by a larger
movement, they fill a personal and/or social-political void. The effects of personal and
political grievance be a precursor or mechanism to a violent end.
Risk- and status-seeking individuals who see violence as the best path to effect
change align their beliefs to match their actions. The actions are believed to be justified,
and it is the irrational thought-provoking process that ultimately leads to violent ends.
Lone wolf terrorists seek respect and status, and they will risk everything to achieve
prominence even if leads to a violent end. Lone wolves identify with certain movements
and feel that the act represents the movement they are associating themselves with. The
risk- and status-seeking process is another form of mechanism.
The unfreezing process cannot be simplified to a mental disconnect. In the event,
the lone wolf must commit the act. The media likes to attribute terrorist acts to some type
of mental illness. Individuals dealing with a personal crisis or who have a mental illness
are more likely to be portrayed as terrorist although one percent of these individual are
lone wolf terrorist. During the process of searching for a new direction, these individuals
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attached themselves to a movement or to another external component or outside
influence. The movement or external component is a mechanism that forms in the
process.
The results from the central research question were consistent with the Global
Terrorism Trend analysis report. In the report, Pajunen (2017) stated
The process of individual transformation into a lone wolf terrorist contains an
immeasurable number of interacting factors. These factors differ from individual
to individual as psychologies and experiences are never the same between two
individuals. However, a commonality between every single lone wolf terrorist is
that they underwent a process. (p. 12)
Very few individuals radicalize to the point of violent endings; to take the thought and
transform it into action is difficult, and the need to avoid being caught it is even harder
because they do not have assistance (Pantucci, Ellis, & Chaplais, 2017).
There is a consensus in terrorism literature that it is impossible to profile lone
wolf terrorists. When looking at any large database of perpetrators, the conclusion is
often that they are drawn from across society, age group, and even gender. Nonetheless,
accepting this limitation, important insights can be gained from this literature (Pantucci et
al., 2017).
Sub question 1
Sub question 1 was as follows: What causes an individual to participate in lone
wolf terrorism? The findings of Sub question 1 indicated that extremist movements and
ideologies are a major cause of individuals participating in lone wolf terrorism.
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Individuals are different, and so are the forms of movements. The rise of the selfdeveloped lone wolf has created a problem that continues to puzzle national security
officials. Right-wing and Islamist extremist ideologies are common causes among the
self-developed lone wolf in the leaderless resistance theory.
The theme and experiences that materialized from Sub question 1 included lone
wolf terrorists operating on the fringes of extremist movements with loose associations to
right-wing ideologies, including individuals inspired and fascinated by Islamist
ideologies of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and The Islamic State of Iraq (ISIL), and
those with self-developed ideologies who commit violence based on political, religious,
or social beliefs. Lone wolf terrorist seems to have reemerged in the later part of the 20th
century by right-wing, Islamic, and other types of extremists. Unlike a terrorist group,
lone wolves are hard to counter. Though they may not have organizational support, their
chances of being caught are less risky and their liabilities decrease than if they were in a
group (Bates, 2012). Bates (2012) also mentioned that “Though lone wolf terrorists selfradicalized, their motivation may not always be political or religious. Lone wolf terrorists
may be motivated by personal agendas in response to some real or perceived
organizational event” (p.4).
Sub question 2
Sub question 2 was as follows: Are there consistent and significant indicators that
can characterize a potential lone wolf actor? The findings of sub question 2 consist of
several indicators: gender, the internet, radical expressions, fixation, identification, and
pseudo spontaneous communication. There are signs for help before violence erupts, yet,
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the signs are overlooked until after the act has occurred. The “See Something, Say
Something” media campaign is an important part in the fight against lone wolf terrorism.
The theme that materialized the most in what significant indicators can characterize a
lone wolf terrorist show pseudo spontaneous communication as the major indicator for
sub question 2.
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano cautioned that lone wolf terrorism
may be rising sooner than later. The current attacks are on a smaller scale now,
but, with the rise of lone wolf activities, it is only a matter of time before the big
boom occurs. Therefore, when individuals spontaneously act, they are most
difficult to prevent and there is nothing to intercept communication wise (Simon,
2013).
The day of the Boston bombings was not the first time the FBI had heard of
Tamerlan Tsarnaev. A “foreign government” had asked the bureau to investigate him
early in 2011, warning that he was a follower of radical Islam. In the case of Hasan, the
warnings were also there. Hasan made statements justifying homicide bombings, spewed
anti-American hatred, and reached out to al-Qaeda (Simon, 2013, p.1). Where the most
attention, help, and funding is needed is either not a top priority or they simply refuse to
acknowledge the growing threat of the lone wolf phenomenon. Past behavior should be
analyzed to see where the catalysts lie (Simeon, 2010).
Reflections
I knew the lone wolf was a reemerging phenomenon. I also knew that research
was limited regarding the phenomenon and that most work pertaining to the lone wolf
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was discovered through organizational terrorism. My desire to explore and gain insight
into the lone wolf terrorist while contributing to the body of literature was very
motivational for me. Although I had a sampling methodology idea for the
representativeness of the study, that idea changed when new themes and codes emerged
during the analyzing process.
More research needs to be conducted on the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism.
This is not a once for all study on domestic lone wolf terrorism, but it does provide a
practical framework for the mechanisms and processes that the lead individuals to be
drawn to and/or away from a violent end. What this study does not do is provide relative
case analysis within the design of the study. To get a better understanding of the domestic
lone wolf, case analysis should be applied to this study explanation. The domestic lone
wolf will continue to be a fanatic, as there will always be a need counter the threat.
Limitations of the Study
In chapter 1, I discussed the limitations of the study the term ‘terrorism’ itself.
Terrorism is defined several ways and it depends on the personnel, agency, state, or
country. I used RAND and the GTD definitions for the study; however, others define it
differently. I used phenomenological design composing 177 incidents that took place in
the U.S. post 9/11. These incidents may not give an accurate representation of acts in
other countries. In addition, the results may not reflect beyond the individual’s experience
in the study or be comparable to other populaces of lone wolf terrorists. When looking at
any large database of perpetrators, the conclusion is drawn from across society, age
group, and even gender. Nonetheless, important insights can be gained from this
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literature. Future research should mirror previous studies, but different questions will
likely garner different results using the same research method.
Recommendations
Research on lone wolf terrorists is sparse and group analysis is used to describe
and reflect the lone wolf terrorist experience. I took the sparse data that was available and
added to the collection of research. One recommendation I suggest is to continue
secondary analysis of previous studies because there is pre-established levels of validity
and reliability and the study was pre-designed. I caution profiling these individuals or
creating typologies because there is no model that fits all perpetrators. Researching more
into the extremisms and the subgroups of lone wolves could prove beneficial from their
unique profiles. Lone wolves that have a mental illness should not be a sole indicator or
viewed as a reduced threat. In the least, it should be looked upon as further value toward
the comprehension of the lone wolf terrorist.
I recommend gaining access to a larger pool of perpetrators to obtain further
diverse perspectives and experiences. The research that is currently available is unique
and opportunities exist to advance value to this reemerging phenomenon. The process of
radicalization and the perpetrators should continue to be a central focus. As the threat
emerges, so will the different types of perpetrators and experiences of everyone
(Pantucci, Ellis, & Chaplais, 2016). Further research on Internet radicalization should be
conducted because the role of the internet and how it guides individuals to carry out the
act shows that it is a powerful tool for lone terrorist. Websites are virtual training rooms,
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offering numerous of things such as firing missiles, making bombs, and raising morale
within oneself.
Implications
The findings could assist national security officials and intelligence agencies in
identifying lone wolf individuals, weighing the actual threat versus the perception,
developing better counterterrorism strategies for the lone wolf phenomenon, and
enhancing relations with outside agencies. This is not just a national security problem,
and all elements, locally and statewide, are needed to reduce the threat. Local and
statewide officials are first responders and are in position to assist the government.
The literature implicates further research should be implemented around personal
and political grievance, right-wing ideologies, and the significant indicators. Those who
are grieving feel that an injustice has occurred to them or in society, and the grievance
carries over into actions. This significant development could possibly lead to why other
violent crimes are committed. Right-wing ideology findings further implicated that these
individuals are more likely to commit domestic terrorist acts than Islamist or selfdeveloped terrorists. Focusing on right-wing subgroups could give a more accurate
account than generalizing the concept of all right-wing groups.
No specific indicators can characterize the potential lone wolf terrorist. But things
like spontaneous communication, radical expressions, and being preoccupied by a cause
or person could drive the point home. The act is intentional and the type of target lone
wolves attack tells a story. However, judging a book by the cover leads to invalid
analysis and invalid conclusions. The reality is that it is hard to quantify anything with
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lone wolf terrorism.
The three significant developments can set the stage for radical movements within
lone wolf terrorist. The developments are large enough to include in the body of research,
yet, precise enough to put into context detailed aspects on the lone wolf mechanisms and
processes (Pajunen, 2013). Adopting extremist views is not just a Muslim’s prerogative;
it can be anyone’s prerogative as was demonstrated in the study. The intricate nature of
these developments in the study reaffirms the compound process of being drawn to or
away from violent ends. The reemergence of the domestic lone wolf will continue and
merits further research. This study provides another framework for the radicalization
process of the lone wolf.
Implications for Social and Policy Change
If national security official’s focus on mental health or mental illness, the fear of
lone wolves should be of no concern, on the other hand exaggerating the phenomenon
may be. The problem is that the threat of lone wolves is creating a real impact, certainly
calculated, by facilitating policy change in the United States, and burdening relationships
causing a distrust between communities and law enforcement. The fear of Muslims is
rising in the United States. Post 9/11 attacks against Muslim or their properties have
increased.
The fundamental challenge of national security and politics is peril to our basic
liberties. Right-wing ideological extremist are problems and causes of lone wolf terrorism
in the United States. The fear of terrorism and Muslims has created more anti-immigrant
politicians despite a low number of attacks from Islamist ideology extremist. A
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significant measure involves conformity: the less they grieve about injustices, the more
likely they will be in accord to existing social standards, outlooks, and customs.
Having outside relations with other agencies and the community can reduce
inspirations to act violently and promote cooperation across the board. The measures
listed above, whether single-handedly or in grouping, do not prevent lone wolf acts. But
it does make them more likely to be exposed in the process, less dangerous when not
found and less efficient after an attack. They are critical for reducing lone wolf acts,
which makes the phenomenon less probable and less perilous.
Conclusion
This study addressed the paradox between the considerable media attention lone
wolf terrorism has received and the lack of sufficient examination attributed to the
phenomenon by exploring, identifying, and describing the mechanisms and processes that
lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act
unilaterally and without direction toward violent ends. Downing and Mayer (2013)
asserted that lone wolves are more dangerous than an established terrorist hierarchy,
which lets them act upon a situation that plays out in their minds. These indicators are
more than enough to pose a huge threat to national security based upon the mystique of
the threat.
Findings for the central research question and sub questions revealed that there
are three individual-level underlying mechanisms and processes (personal and political
grievance, risk and status seeking, unfreezing), the phenomenon of the domestic lone
wolf terrorist is not limited to a movement. Rather, lone terrorists operate on the fringes
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of extremist movements, with such loose associations being connected to right-wing
ideologies, inspired and fascinated by Islamist ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and The
Islamic State of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant (ISIL), and self-developed ideologies
facilitating violence based on political, religious, or social change. The findings also
suggest that gender, the internet, fixation, identification, and pseudo spontaneous
communication are some of the indicators that characterize the potential lone wolf
terrorist.
The purpose of this study was to focus on the phenomenon apart from other types
of political violence and terrorism, using the RAND and GTD databases. Using the
leaderless resistance theory, the bearing of this theory was found upon ideological
inclusiveness that leaderless resistance advocates. Although leaderless resistance is used
to shun detection, penetration, and execution by the government, ideological
inclusiveness can be an advantage for individuals involved in groups (Joosse, 2007).
There is no winning with the American public. Countering domestic lone wolf
terrorism is difficult and is easier said than done. My desire to gain insight into the
perspectives of the lone wolf and having the ability to contribute to the body of literature
was very motivational for me. While the research currently available is unique,
opportunities exist to add value to this reemerging phenomenon. More importantly, the
findings could assist national security officials and intelligence agencies in identifying
lone wolf individuals, weighing the actual threat versus the perception, developing better
counter strategies for the lone wolf phenomenon, and enhancing relations with outside
agencies and the citizens of the United States.
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Appendix A: Central Research Question and Subquestions
Central research question: What are the underlying mechanisms and processes that lead
individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act
unilaterally and without direction to violent ends?
Theme: In brief, the three individual-level underlying mechanisms and processes that
lead individuals to be drawn to or away from an existing radical movement and to act
unilaterally and without direction to violent ends are: Personal and political grievances,
Risk and status seeking, and unfreezing.
Sub question 1: What causes an individual to participate in lone wolf terrorism?
Theme: First, the phenomenon of the domestic lone wolf terrorist is not limited in extent
to a particular type of movement. Rather lone terrorist operate on the fringes of extremist
movements, with such loose associations being connected to right-wing ideologies,
inspired and fascinated by Islamic ideologies of Arabian Peninsula and The Islamic State
of Iraq (AQAP) and Levant (ISIL), and self-developed ideologies facilitating violence
based on political, religious, or social change.
Sub question 2: Are there consistent and significant indicators that can characterize a
potential lone wolf actor?
Theme: In characterizing the lone wolf terrorist, there are several indicators: gender,
internet, radical expressions, pseudo spontaneous communication, and identification.
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Appendix B: Terms and Defintions
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula- is a militant Islamist organization.
Anarchists- generally oppose “illegitimate authority”.
Animal Liberation Front- is an international, clandestine leaderless resistance that
engages in direct action in pursuit of animal rights.
Anti-abortion extremists- individuals or groups who believe abortion is unethical and
that violence is justified against people and establishments providing abortion services.
Anti-government extremists- refer to any fringe movement with an antipathy towards
government.
Anti-gun control extremists- individuals that see any restriction on the manufacture,
ownership, or use of firearms infringes this sacred right.
Anti-Israeli- against Israel.
Anti-Kim Jong- against King Jong.
Anti-liberal Extremists- believe the United States of America is a Christian country that
its people are Christian, and that government reflect its beliefs and values and oppose all
effort to deny or weaken Christian heritage.
Anti-Muslim Extremists- the threat of infiltration of Sharia, or Islamic law, into the U.S.
court systems.
Anti-Police Extremists- opposed to or against the police.
Anti-Semitic- refers to hostile or prejudice against Jews because of their religion and/or
ethnicity.
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Anti-Sikh Extremists- individuals who mistaken Sikhism’s for Islam and believes
violence is justified
Anti-Trump Extremists- against President Trump.
Anti-white Extremists- against white supremacy.
Courtroom Extremists- against the court system.
Earth Liberation Front- uses “economic” sabotage and guerilla warfare to stop the
destruction of the environment.
Fixation- obsessed with a person or cause.
Gender- Male or Female
Identification- willingness of the attacker to commit violence as an agent of a particular
belief system.
Internet- makes it easier for would be lone wolf terrorist to uncover ideologies and
associations supporting their belief systems, and for them to share their intentions and
actions with via social media.
Jihadi-inspired extremists- refer to Islamic extremism occurring within the United
States.
Minuteman American Defense-is a volunteer group headed by Chris Simox and
dedicated to preventing illegal crossings of the United States border.
Muslim extremist- any form of Islam that opposes “democracy”, the rule of law,
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.
NEO-Nazi-extremists- share a hatred for Jews and love for Adolf Hitler.
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Personal and Political grievance- Individual radicalization usually occurs with a
blending of personal and group grievance, a blending in which personal grievance means
hostility or negative identification with a group seen as perpetrators of injustice, and
group grievance means positive identification with a group seen as the victims of
injustice.
ProLGBT- extremists- Those who promote homosexuality and same sex marriage.
Pseudo spontaneous communication-involves the intentional and strategic
manipulation of some formal displays.
Radical expressions- are used in postings to vent grievances.
Right-wing extremists- encompass individuals or groups associated with white
supremacist, anti-government, sovereign citizen, militia, or other ideologies that target
specific religious, ethnic, or other minority groups.
Risk and status seeking- Inspired and/or fascinated by the teachings of Anwar Awlaki’s,
Abu Muhammad al Adnani, and or Osama bin Laden under Al’Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula or The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) for whom violence may seem
the best path respect.
Soveign Citizens- is a loose grouping of American litigants, commentators, tax
protesters, and financial-scheme promoters.
Unfreezing- Unfreezing is a personal crisis such as a mental disorder or illness in
disconnection that leaves an individual with less to lose and in search of new directions
White extremists- the belief that white people are superior to those of all other races.
Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) - is a force multiplier of Al Qaida.
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Unknown- bleak to no identity at all.
Veterans for non-religious memorials- individuals or groups that will stop at nothing to
intimidate communities to tear down veterans memorials.
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Dear Mr. Williams,
This email is to notify you that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) confirms that your
doctoral capstone entitled, “Leaderless Resistance: The Manifestation of Lone Wolves in
the U.S.” meets Walden University’s ethical standards. Since this project will serve as a
Walden doctoral capstone, the Walden IRB will oversee your capstone data analysis and
results reporting. Your IRB approval number is 06-13-17-0307965.
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the final version of the documents that have been submitted to IRB@mail.waldenu.edu as
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